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SPINNING IN A HOT IPO-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
OR BUSINESS AS USUAL?
THERESE H. MAYNARD*
INTRODUCTION
I have a story to tell. A story with several lessons-some familiar,
some novel. This story reflects the rapid pace of change in today's
securities markets. It reflects the competitive pressures of today's
securities markets and the influential power that these forces of
competition wield in shaping the business practices of the
participants in our modern financial world. It reflects the prevailing
sense of business ethics among the participants in today's business
environment. Finally, and most importantly, this story reflects the
essential role that the rule of law continues to play in defining the
scope of fiduciary duty imposed on individual managers operating
in our modern business world. But, I get ahead of myself.
My story begins with the incredibly hot market for new issues
that prevailed for a brief period in the late 1990s.' As old-timers
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I am grateful to my colleagues for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article: Mark Bonenfant, Bob Braun, Deborah
DeMoh, Jennie Guzee, Ali Jhangari, Peter Kostant, Don Langevoort, Dave Lee, Jeff LeSage,
Philip Maynard, and Kathryn Tate. I would like to thank Alex Shukman and Ann Carey for
their invaluable research assistance
1. The IPO market of the late 1990s was a hot-issue market like none before on Wall
Street. "All kinds of companies go public, but none in recent years gripped the IPO market the
way technology stocks did. Their astonishing first-day gains, mostly on NASDAQ, were a
hallmark of the bull market of the late 1990s and early in the year 2000." Kate Kelly,
Investors Discover Gravity As IPOs Return to Earth, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2001, at Cl.
However, the Internet-fueled IPO mania that started in 1998 came to a crashing close early
in the year 2000.
New issues started the year [2000] strong, with many early-spring IPOs
doubling, even tripling, their offering prices.
Then came April 4, the day the NASDAQ Composite Index and the Dow Jones
Industrial Average each fell more than 500 points intra-day. There had been
some weakness in technology stocks before then, but investors were really
spooked by the market's falling so far so quickly. ...
Many of the companies that fell the furthest in the spring [2000] sell-off were
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recall, it was in this hot new-issue market that we saw the initial
public offering (IPO) of VA Linux Systems, Inc. Linux's IPO went
effective at $30 a share and by the close of its first day of trading, it
had surged 698% to close at a whopping $239.25, for the biggest-
ever first-day gain.2 In this market, the competition to get an
the once-hot IPOs of 1999. Investors became skeptical of IPOs in general-not
just tech stocks.
Raymond Hennessey, Some PerceiveABright Side to IPOs of 2000, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,2000,
at C16; see also Raymond Hennessey, For Every IPO Winner, Now There Are at Least Two
Losers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2000, at C1 ("By a ratio of more than 2-to-i, IPO losers are
outpacing the gainers in 2000."). Investor skepticism continued in the IPO market of 2001.
See, e.g., Raymond Hennessey, IPO Market Returns To SickbedAfter Kraft, WALL ST. J., June
18, 2001, at C14 (reflecting the continuing"chill" in the current IPO market, "the new-issues
sector is entering the summer [of 2001] in questionable health"); Kelly, supra, at C1 ("So far
this year [20011, only 13 companies have gone public, making 2001 one of the flattest IPO
markets since 1991 .... "); Suzanne McGee & Kate Kelly, Banks, Investors Adjust to Chill In
IPO Market, WAL ST. J., Apr. 6,2001, at Cl.
2. Terzah Ewing et al., VA Linux IPO Soars a Record 698%, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1999,
at Cl ("Offered at $30 a share, VA Linux exploded to end the day at a 4 p.m. price of $239.25.
It was the first time an IPO has ever finished the regular session at above $200 a share on
the Nasdaq Stock Market."); Kelly, supra note 1, at Cl ("VA Linux's astounding 698% price
pop set the record for first-day performance of an IPO, as its shares soared from [the offering
price of] $30 to [close the day at] $239.25."). Reflecting the heady days of the hot IPO market
of 1998-2000:
Analysts called the [VA Linux IPO] stock "a runaway hit" and even "the next
Microsoft." But within three months, shares of the company, which makes
hardware tailored to the free Linux operating system, had dropped 57%.... (As
of March 6, 2001,] in Nasdaq Stock Market trading, shares of VA Linux [closed
at] ... $4.06. Still, more than a year after the stock's debut on Dec. 9, 1999, the
shares are off 98% from their first-day high.
Id.
Although it experienced the largest first-day gain, VA Linux was not the only technology
company to go public and experience this kind of sizeable first dayprice "pop" in the incredibly
hot market for IPOs that roared in the late 1990s. As another example, theglobe.com, which
went public on November 13, 1998, closed 606% higher than its offering price; however, in
February, 2001, the Wall Street Journal announced that the "Nasdaq National Market is
planning to delist the company." Steven Lipin et al., Bids and Offers: Inside the World of
Corporate Finance & Wall Street, WAIL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2001, at C16. Reflecting the incredible
"come-down" of the IPO market, "not a single one of the top-10 gainers [in the hot IPO market
of 1998-2000] is anywhere near its first-day close." Id.
I realize that publishing on this topic in the current moribund market for IPOs is perhaps
not as timely as it would have been had I published this Article at the height of the hot issue
market. But my bad timing does not undermine the relevance of the morals of my story
regarding the practice of spinning. Indeed, the fundamental issues raised by the practice of
spinning continue to grab headlines in the financial press. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC's
IPO Probe, NATL L.J., July 9, 2001, at B8 ("Three-pronged investigation by the [SEC], the
[NASD] and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of NewYork has been probing
for the past year the practices of underwriters in allocating stock in 'hot' or oversubscribed
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allocation of shares in a hot IPO was fierce owing in no small part
to the widely held perception that IPOs--especially of Internet-
related issuers-would yield tremendous profits to any buyer lucky
enough to get the opportunity to purchase hot IPO shares from the
underwriters.
In the midst of this frenzy of IPO activity, at least one individual
investor made a substantial profit flipping shares allocated to him
as part of a hot IPO. According to a November, 1997 article in the
Wall Street Journal,3 Joseph Cayre, who was the CEO of a privately
initial public offerings (IPOs) and regulatory action appears imminent.");'Charles Gasparino
et al., SEC Targets IPO Process With Probes: Latest Case Poses Challenge for Agency, But
Solutions Exist, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2000, at Cl ("The [SEC's] probe into unusually large
commissions for initial public stock allocations is part of the agency's growing effort to root
out abuses in the free-wheeling market for IPOs, the symbol of 1990s Wall Street excess.");
Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Who's to Blame for the Nasdaq Massacre?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2001,
at A23 (reporting an SEC investigation "into whether some of the [investment] banks tried
to share the wealth with themselves by extorting inflated trading commissions from
customers who were lucky enough to be granted allocations of such coveted IPOs. The VA
Linux offering has reportedly become a focus [of the SEC's investigation]," and indicating that
"the SEC's poking around may at least shed a small light on how the spoils of the Internet
frenzy [i.e., the hot IPO market of the late 1990s] were distributed."); Michael Schroeder,
Lawmakers Urge Broad Inquiry Of Analysts, Securities Business, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2001,
at C16 ("Federal lawmakers said that an inquiry into the independence of stock analysts is
just the first step in a much broader inquiry into other conflicts that favor Wall Street's
interests over individual investors."); Randall Smith, U.S. Ends Probe Into Underwriting Fees
Charged by Securities Firms for IPOs, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2001, at Cll (noting Goldman
Sachs report that the Justice Department has "'closed its investigation of an alleged [price-
fixing] conspiracy among securities underwriters to fix underwriting fees,'" while separately
reporting that it had received government subpoenas "in connection with a separate [ongoing]
probe into the allocation of hot IPOs by securities firms"); Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam,
CSFB Says It Has Fired 3 Brokers: Move Acknowledges IPO-Allocation Abuse, WALL ST. J.,
June 29, 2001, at Cl ("Credit Suisse First Boston fired three brokers it had placed on leave
in April, in its strongest acknowledgment that there were abuses in the way the big securities
firm allocated shares of hot IPOs."); Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, SEC Seeks Wall Street
Firms' Records On Stock Purchases as Part of lPO Probe, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30,2001, at C19
("The [SEC] is seeking records from Wall Street securities firms in purchases of stocks soon
after their initial public offerings, as it probes possible abuses in how IPO shares were
awarded in the technology stock boom of 1999-2000 ... ."); Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam,
Wall Street Tab In IPO Lawsuits Could Reach $100 Million, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at Cl
("Wall Street is facing a legal bill that could reach $100 million-not counting any possible
judgments or penalties-for defending itself against the mushrooming class-action lawsuits
arising from the IPO-allocation investigations," and that"the firms generally deny any wrong
doing, saying their IPO allocations were within the boundaries of accepted practice on Wall
Street.").
3. Michael Siconolfi, The Spin Desk. Underwriters Set Aside IPO Stock for Officials Of
Potential Customers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12,1997, at Al.
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held computer software firm, GT Interactive Software, was lucky
enough to receive a sizeable allocation of shares of Pixar's hot IPO.4
Pixar's IPO shares soared by 77% by the close of its first day of
trading, and Mr. Cayre was heard to brag about the $2 million profit
he made when he "flipped" (sold) his Pixar shares in the
aftermarket.5
In a market dominated by institutional players,6 one might
wonder how it was that an individual investor such as Mr. Cayre
was able to receive the sizeable number of Pixar shares that he was
allocated by Pixar's lead underwriter, Robertson Stephens.7
According to the Wall Street Journal, the allocation of Pixar shares
to Mr. Cayre's personal trading account at Robertson Stephens was
apparently made in anticipation that Mr. Cayre would direct his
company's future investment banking business to Robertson
Stephens.8 In fact, when GT Interactive Software went public a
month later, Robertson Stephens served as the lead underwriter of
the company's IPO.
4. Not all investors in hot IPOs were as lucky as Mr. Cayre. As in the case of Mr. Cayre,
the built-in profit was there for many investors-because the shares in these oversubscribed
offerings would trade at a substantial premium over the fixed IPO price-but most investors
did not receive as many shares and therefore their profits were more modest as compared to
Mr. Cayre's gain.
5. The practice known as "flipping" is not the focus of this Article, although it bears
mentioning that this practice also sparked controversy in the hot issue market of the 1990s.
Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosure of Restrictions on Flipping IPO Securities, 74
TUL. L. REV. 883 (2000) (analyzing disclosure issues arising out of recent practice of
underwriting firms to impose penalties on buyers who promptly flipped their IPO allocations);
Michael Siconolfi, On-Line Firms Move to Quash IPO "Flipping," WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1998,
at Cl; Michael Siconolfi & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Boosts Penalty OnIPO'Flips,'WALL
ST. J., July 31, 1998, at Cl; Michael Siconolfi & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Brokers Press
Small Investors To Hold IPO Shares, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1998, at Al (describing penalties
imposed by broker-dealers on [primarily individual] customers who promptly sell their IPO
allocations).
6. E.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURMTES REGULATION § 6.2, at
87 (Practitioner's ed., 3d ed. Supp. 1999) ("As a result of these and other ways in which
[underwriting] firms favor their larger [institutional] customers, most [individual] investors
do not have access to hot issues in the new issues market.").
7. John C. Coffee, Jr., "Spinning" for Dollars: IPO's and Allocation of Hot Issues,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 1998, at 5 (describing the mechanics of allocating hot IPO shares to the
personal discretionary trading accounts of individual corporate executives).
8. Siconolfi, supra note 3, at Al ("Many investment banks silently allocate chunks ofhot
new stocks to the personal brokerage accounts they hold for corporate executives and venture
capitalists ... in an apparent bid for business from the executives' firms.").
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"Spinning" is the term of art that Wall Street generally uses to
refer to the decision of Robertson Stephens, as lead underwriter, to
allocate shares of Pixar's hot IPO to Mr. Cayre's personal trading
account. In turn, Mr. Cayre "flips"-that is, sells-these shares at
a substantial profit and pockets the profit (here, $2 million) in his
own personal trading account.9 The underwriters practice of
9. The investor profits because of the substantial premium at which these new-issue
shares traded in the aftermarket typical of hot IPOs of the late 1990s.
Companies continue to leave money on the table when they go public .... A
criticism of initial public stock offerings has been that while shares soar, the
companies themselves don't enjoy the full benefit because their proceeds are
based on the offering price, not the price the stock reaches in the market.
Raymond Hennessey, Start-Ups Still Fail To Benefit Fully As IPO Prices Soar, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 28, 2000, at C21. Many commentators believe that the premium in fact belongs to the
issuer, and therefore, Mr. Cayre's profit reflects certain anomalies in the pricing of the stock
sold in the issuers IPO. See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, The LawsuitAvoidance Theory
of Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17 (1993); Lawrence M.
Benveniste & Paul A. Spinat, How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer Price and
Allocation of New Issues, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 343 (1989); Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are
Underpriced, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1986). In a novel twist in this long-standing controversy
surrounding the pricing of IPOs, and almost at the zenith of this most recent hot IPO market,
the Wall Street Journal reported in 1999 that
Corporate America has left a record $23 billion on the table from IPOs this
year-but no one's going hungry.
The number represents the staggering gain generated in the first day of
trading for all initial public stock offerings this year through October.
Translation: Corporate issuers could have pocketed a total of $23 billion more
had their IPOs been priced to demand.
So you would think the issuers-and the Wall Street underwriters that could
have earned steeper fees-would be livid.
Now, a new study shows why you would be wrong. The study, by professors
Tim Loughran of the University of Notre Dame and Jay R. Ritter at the
University of Florida, concludes that issuers are so thrilled by their sudden
wealth that they basically don't care.
[Essentially], the researchers say, the company [andits insiders] will focus
more on the delightful surprise that [the company] is worth more than it
anticipated-rather than on the dour mathematics that it could have eked even
more money out of the IPO.
Robert McGough & Randall Smith, IPOIssuers Don't Mind Money Left on the Table, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 3, 1999, at C1.
The study referred to in this Wall Street Journal article created quite a stir and added to
the continuing controversy regarding best practices for underwriters in making IP0
allocations. All of this public foment resulted in a variety of investigations by state and federal
securities regulators inquiring into the priorities and practices used by companies, their
insiders, and their underwriters to decide how to price the offering and to allocate the shares
sold in the company's IP0. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing several of
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spinning shares in hot IPOs to individual investors as the quid pro
quo for future underwriting business is the focus of this Article.
Spinning is a story with a number of different dimensions. My
analysis of spinning will be separated into two distinct lines of
inquiry. In Part I, I analyze whether the allocation decisions of the
lead underwriter in the context of an IPO violate any provisions of
either the federal securities law or the rules of the NASD. Here, the
story focuses on the conduct of the managing underwriter, such as
Robertson Stephens, who served as lead underwriter for Pixar's hot
IPO. In Part II, I shift the focus of the analysis to the conduct of the
investor who receives the hot IPO allocation, regardless whether he
or she flips the shares." Now the focus of the story is on individuals
such as Mr. Cayre, the CEO who flipped his allocation of Pixar
shares for a substantial profit, and whether this sort of conduct
creates any disclosure issues under either federal or state law. In
Part III, I examine the separate issue of whether this CEO may be
usurping a corporate opportunity when someone such as Mr. Cayre
these investigations, many of which are still pending); Gasparino et al., supra note 2, at Cl:
In the new probe, first reported in The Wall Street Journal earlier this month
[December 2000], the SEC and the Manhattan U.S. Attorney's office are jointly
probing whether some [institutional] investors paid larger-than-usual stock-
trading commissions in exchange for allocations of IPOs that surged in price on
their first day of trading, and whether those payments constituted illegal
kickbacks. The penalty-bid issue ... resulted .... [in] [t]he Massachusetts
securities division filling] a case against a securities firm based in Boca Raton,
... [In addition,] the North American Securities Administration Association
formed a task force in 1998 to look at penalty bids. Deborah Bortner,
Washington state's securities chief and a task-force member, said the group
wrote a report outlining the best practices involving IPO allocation, but it was
never published.
As captivating as this issue is, the existence of this premium, in the offering's aftermarket
trading price, is an issue that lies outside the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article seeks
to focus attention on an issue that has largely been ignored in the public debate so far,
namely, whether Mr. Cayre breached his fiduciary duty to GT Interactive when he flipped his
allocation of Pixar's hot IPO shares at a substantial premium over the offering price, without
making any disclosure of this allocation to his corporation, GT Interactive Software.
10. The investor's conduct may give rise to a violation of fiduciary duty, but one that lies
not just in the "flipping" of the shares into the post-distribution trading market for a
substantial profit. Rather, it lies in the CEO/investor seizing these hot IPO shares and
keeping this allocation for his own personal account-conduct which I believe may constitute
a usurpation of a corporate opportunity in breach of the CEO's fiduciary duty to his
corporation.
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receives Pixar's hot IPO shares for his own account, an inquiry
which may give rise to a possible breach of fiduciary duty claim
against the corporate officer.
The moral of this story is set out in Part IV, where I explore the
implications of my analysis of the story of spinning, focusing
primarily on corporate managers, as well as the transactional
lawyers who advise these business clients. By way of conclusion,
this story of "spinning in a hot IPO" provides compelling evidence
that the courts should continue to strongly enforce a rigorous
standard of fiduciary duty as the default rule in our modem system
of corporate law. Thus, the lessons learned from the story of
"spinning" stand in sharp contrast to the modem law and economics
view that parties should be afforded complete freedom to contract
for the entire scope of fiduciary duty between owners and managers
of the corporate enterprise. In this way, the story of spinning serves
to emphasize the important and influential role that the law of
fiduciary duty continues to play in shaping and monitoring
standards of fair and ethical conduct for modern corporate
managers, and, in the process, serves to reinforce the professional
responsibility of modern corporate lawyers.
I. SPINNING BY THE LEAD UNDERWRITER
By way of general background, the lead underwriter is a broker-
dealer firm that is subject to regulation by both the SEC and the
NASD. The issuer hires the lead underwriter to manage a
company's IPO." As a matter of generally accepted practice today,
underwriters offer investors-both individuals and institutions-the
opportunity to invest in hot IPOs. In recent years, institutional
investors have dominated the market for IPOs.' In the hot equity
11. For a more detailed description of the factors involved in the company's decision to go
public, see LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECUrTIES LAw 23-28 (1998);
David B. Rea & William J. Grant, Jr., The Syndication and Marketing Process, in SECURITIES
UNDERWRITING: A PRACTITIONFe'S GUIDE 277 (Kenneth J. Bialkin & William J. Grant, Jr.
eds., 1985). See generally Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure and
Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1981).
12. Siconolfi, supra note 3, at Al ("It is no news that underwriters make most of the
shares in hot IPOs available not to the little-guy investor but to institutions, such as mutual-
fund companies and pension funds, that provide a lot of trading commissions and other
business."). The reasons for this dominance of institutional investors lie outside the focus of
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market of the late 1990s, however, individual investors increasingly
demanded the opportunity to invest in hot IPOs and their voice did
not go unnoticed. With some important assistance from recent
developments in Internet-based technologies, the securities markets
responded by increasing the direct participation of individuals as
retail consumers of shares of hot IPOs.' The focus of this section,
therefore, is on the allocation of shares made by the lead
underwriters in a hot IPO,'4 with the primary emphasis on the
decision to allocate hot IPO shares directly to the trading accounts
of certain types of individual investors.
Under the 1934 Act, 5 the NASD has been delegated considerable
authority to regulate the lead underwriter and its practice of
allocating IPO investment opportunities, subject to SEC oversight.
The SEC reviews both the promulgation of the NASD's substantive
rules, as well as the enforcement of these NASD rules. 6 In addition,
the registration statement that the issuer files with the SEC must
include detailed disclosures regarding the underwriter's plan of
distribution for the corporate issuer's IPO. 7 This section first
examines various aspects of the SEC's disclosure requirements as
they apply to the underwriter's decisions regarding allocating
shares in an IPO. More importantly, however, the remainder of this
section analyzes the various NASD rules that regulate the lead
this Article.
13. For a more detailed description of the impact of the Internet, and specifically the
growth and continuing development of online underwriting by e-bankers who appear to have
targeted individual investors as the primary market for their services see generally Witt
Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 498545 (July 14, 1999); Terzah Ewing &
Joshua Harris Prager, Many are Finding IPOs Still Out of Reach, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000,
at C21.
14. See generally RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECuRITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 89-95 (8th ed. 1998) (describing the lead underwriter's allocation authority over
the "retail pot").
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (2000).
16. Id. §§ 19, 78s; JENNINGS ETAL., supra note 14, at 104-07.
17. That portion of the prospectus describing the plan of distribution for securities sold
in an IPO is usually drafted by the underwriters and their counsel. John S. D'Alimonte &
Linda G. Schechter, Underwriting Documents: Their Purpose and Content, in MECHANICS OF
UNDERWRITING 1995, at 213 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-
879,1995); see also infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (describingin more detail certain
disclosures required under Regulation S-K as to the plan of distribution).
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underwriter's decision as to how to allocate shares in an IPO
transaction.
A. Disclosure of the Underwriter's Allocation Decisions Under
Federal Securities Laws
In general, the lead underwriter's decision as to how to allocate
the shares of an IPO is not subject to substantive regulation under
the terms of either the 1933 or the 1934 Acts.18 This means that the
lead underwriter, acting pursuant to the authority delegated to it by
the other members of the underwriting syndicate, has broad
discretion in deciding how to allocate the shares in an IPO.19
18. Gasparino et al., supra note 2, at C1 (noting that underwriters "currently have broad
discretion as to how, and to whom, they allocate IPO shares. Put another way. Wall Street can
dole out IPOs basically any way it sees fit," and that "IPO allocation is generally an area in
which the SEC may have limited authority to act."); Deborah R. Meshulam, Taking Stock:
Spin Cycle: How to Allocate Shares of "Hot Issues,"THE REcORDER, Mar. 26, 1998, at 4 ("No
specific SEC rules govern the process of allocating shares in a securities offering.").
19. One of the standard provisions included in the Agreement Among Underwriters for
a firm commitment underwriting of a fixed price offering-the type of underwriting
arrangement customarily used in a hot IPO-is a clause whereby all syndicate members
delegate broad discretionary authority to the lead underwriter to make final decisions as to
the allocation of shares in the IPO for retail distribution to syndicate members as well as to
any selling group members who might be recruited to participate in the IPO process. See
generally 3B HAROLD S. BLOOmENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECUTIES AND FEDERAL
COPORATELAW §§ 8:1,8:7,12:42 (2001); HAROLD S.BLOOMEIT HAL, GoINGPUBLiCHANDBOOK
262-69 (2001); Siconolfi, supra note 3, atAl (stating that underwriters "offer most of the [IPO]
shares to biginstitutional client companies. A small number, known as the 'retail pot,' are set
aside for individuals, and spin shares typically come from this pot."). A registered public
offering will be a fixed price offering, which is to say that all shares sold in the offering will
be sold to the investing public at the same price. JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 236 (2d ed. 1997) ("The cornerstone of the underwriting
syndicate is that all members must sell the offered security to the public at a fixedprice that
is stated in the registration statement and accompanying prospectus.") (emphasis added);
JENNINGS ETAL., supra note 14, at 97 ("The typical underwriting agreement requires all the
underwriters and selling group members to adhere to the public offering price as stated in the
prospectus."). The distribution of shares in an IPO to the investing public will usuallyinvolve
use of an underwriting syndicate and a selling group:
For business reasons, basically relating to the volatility of securities prices,
underwriters in a firm commitment underwriting [who purchase the stock from
the issuer] wish to dispose of [that is, resell] an entire issue almost immediately.
... To accomplish that quick sale, the underwriters often sell a portion of the
securities-at a discount from the [fixed] public offering price-to other
securities firms [i.e., selling group members], which in turn attempt to resell
them to the [investing] public.
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However, the failure to disclose the practices used by the lead
underwriter, acting on behalf of the syndicate, to make its decision
as to the allocation of IPO shares may give rise to several different
types of potential disclosure violations under federal securities
law.2' Let me illustrate these potential disclosure issues in the
context of the lead underwriter's decision to spin out shares of
Pixar's hot IPO to the personal discretionary trading account
maintained by Mr. Cayre with Pixar's lead underwriter, Robertson
Stephens.
Item 508 of Regulation S-K (regarding the issuer's plan of
distribution) generally requires disclosure of the underwriter's plan
for the distribution of the registered public offering. In the context
of the IPO for GT Interactive Software, this would be the plan for
distribution of the common stock of GT Interactive Software.
SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 11, at 29.
Members of the selling group--often referred to as "participating dealers"--
[a]re broker-dealers who for one reason or another (such as [financial] inability
or a conscious desire not to commit the necessary funds) are not members of the
underwriting syndicate but who nonetheless deem it in their financial interests
to become a "participant" in the offering. Hence, they purchase from
underwriters an allocated number of shares offered and resell them to their
customers, their profit being the difference between the purchase price from the
underwriters [and the fixed offering price paid by] their customers.
MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITES LAW 111 (3d ed. 2001).
As used in Wall Street parlance, the "gross spread" usually refers to the difference between
the fixed offering price paid by the investors and the amount received by the issuer. The gross
spread "normally is composed of three parts: (i) the management fee for the managing [or
lead] underwriter, (ii) the underwriting compensation received by the underwriters, and (iii)
the 'selling concession'... [paid to the broker-dealer participating (as either a selling group
member or underwriter) who actually sells the securities to the investor]." COX ETAL., supra,
at 213. Finally, in the case of IPOs and other public offerings, the NASD reviews the
underwriters' compensation arrangements "to assure that member broker-dealers do not
receive unfair or unreasonable compensation for their underwriting activities." Id. at 235. In
addition to this mandatory NASD review, issuers increasingly have been insisting that"some
of their Wall Street underwriters work harder for their pay." Randall Smith, Dear IPO Co-
Underwriter: Work Harder, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2000, at C1 (describing issuers' complaints
about paying management fees to co-managing underwriters on the theory that co-managers
often do not perform sufficient services to justify payment of what often amounts to
extravagant fees.)
20. "In examining whether a broker-dealer, investment advisor or other regulated entity
improperly favors certain investor accounts when allocating hot issues,' the SEC has focused
on whether the firm's allocation practices require disclosure, and if so, whether the [broker-
dealer] firm and those associated with it have adequately disclosed those practices."
Meshulam, supra note 18, at 4.
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Specifically, Item 508(a) requires disclosure of any material
relationship between the issuer, GT Interactive, and the company's
underwriter, Robertson Stephens.21 As a threshold matter, Item
508(a) requires a determination whether Robertson Stephens's prior
allocation of Pixar shares to Mr. Cayre's personal trading account
gives rise to a material relationship between the underwriter and
the registrant.22 Since Item 508(a) does not directly focus on the
relationship between the company's officers and the lead
underwriter, this seems to be a fairly attenuated analysis. It would
seem that disclosure would be required only if there is some
suggestion that the prior allocation was made under circumstances
that-either explicitly or implicitly-obligated Mr. Cayre to use the
services of Robertson Stephens. "Absent such an agreement, it
would seem difficult to establish that there is a 'relationship'
requiring disclosure."" Most securities lawyers would probably
conclude that disclosure of prior spinning activity is not directly
called for under the terms of Item 508.24
In addition, Item 508(c)(2) of Regulation S-K generally requires
disclosure of the plan of distribution for an offering, including "the
terms of any agreement, arrangement, or understanding entered
into with broker(s) or dealer(s) prior to the effective date" of the
issuer's public offering.' Applying the terms of Item 508(c)(2) to a
situation such as Mr. Cayre's prior receipt of shares of Pixar's hot
IPO, the question to be decided is whether Robertson Stephens'
prior allocation to Mr. Cayre gives rise to an "arrangement or
understanding" between the issuer, GT Interactive in this case, and
its lead underwriter, Robertson Stephens, that was entered into
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.508(a) (2001).
22. Id.
23. Meredith B. Cross & Christine Sarudy Roberts, RecentDevelopments in Underwriting
of IPOs: 'Spinning," Syndicate Penalty Bids, in 30TH ANN. SEC. REG. INsT. 597, 599 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B4-7239, 1999).
24. Id. at 5 ('The receipt of IPO shares from an underwriter by an executive of a company,
absent other factors suggesting a quid pro quo relationship, would not seem to be a material
relationship for purposes of Item 508(a)."); Gasparino et al., supra note 2, at C1-C2 ("lilt can
be difficult to prove a clear quid pro quo in establishing wrongdoing. Because underwriters
have such wide discretion, 'the basic practice [ofIPO allocation] is bulletproof,' asserts John
Carroll, a former federal prosecutor who is a defense attorney with the New York firm of
Rogers & Wells.").
25. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 508(c)(2) (2001).
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prior to the effectiveness of GT Interactive's IPO. In other words,
does the allocation of Pixar hot IPO shares to the personal trading
account of Mr. Cayre-as a person who is presumably in a position
to direct GT Interactive's future underwriting business to Robertson
Stephens-give rise to the type of "agreement or understanding"
that requires disclosure under Item 508(c)(2)? In the face of little
concrete guidance on this issue, most securities lawyers seem to
believe that this relationship is too attenuated to give rise to the
kind of material relationship that would require disclosure in the
prospectus for GT Interactive's IPO.28 Indeed, as a general
proposition, "[tihe reason an underwriter might allocate shares to
any particular person has not been viewed as required disclosure"
under Item 508.27
This very well may be a sound conclusion from the underwriter's
perspective, for a number of different reasons, not the least of which
involves the difficult issues of proving up the motivation of the
investment banker who spins shares out to the personal account of
a corporate manager, such as Mr. Cayre. In order to establish the
existence of a "material relationship" as a result of such spinning
activity, it may require proof that the underwriter's allocation was
made as a quid pro quo for the CEO's exercise of his decision-
making authority to direct his company's future underwriting
business to the lead underwriter who decided to spin out hot IPO
shares (of other issuers) to this CEO.' In light of these difficulties,
26. Even assuming that these facts would create the basis for finding a relationship
between a Mr. Cayre and a Robertson Stephens, there is still the separate issue of whether
this relationship is "material" and therefore qualifies as a required item of disclosure under
the terms of Regulation S-K. See Michael Siconolfi, SEC Broadens 'Spinning" Probe To
Corporations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1997, at C1 ("As part of a broader inquiry, the SEC is
examining whether such IPO allocations should have been publicly disclosed by corporations
as 'material' events involving their choice of a particular investment bank to d6 business with,
the person familiar with the matter said."); Michael Siconolfi, SEC, NASD Begin Probes of
IPO "Spin" Accounts, WAIL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1997, at A3 (reporting observation of William
McLucas, the SEC's enforcement chief, that 'there may well be facts and circumstances
where [IPO allocations] cross the threshold of material transactions and certainly ought to
be disclosed' to investors").
27. Cross & Roberts, supra note 23, at 599.
28. Furthermore, the expectation of a quid pro quo would seem to be the most that the
investment banking firm could realistically expect of the company's CEO, in light of the
limited authority of the CEO to decide which investment banking firm will serve as the
company's lead underwriter. This is usually the kind of decision that requires the approval
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we may well decide that Item 508 does not mandate disclosure of
the underwriter's decision to recruit future business from GT
Interactive by allocating shares of a hot IPO to the personal trading
account of an influential manager of that firm,29 such as the
company's CEO, Mr. Cayre.
of the company's board directors. See AmRICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 301, reporter's note (1994):
In general, questions concerningthe authority of senior executives are normally
special issues of agency law, and, as in agency law, the major relevant concepts
are those of actual and apparent authority .... [Tihe accepted modem rule is
that... the president [CEO] has apparent authority byvirtue of that position to
take actions in the ordinary course of business, but not extraordinary actions.
The difficulty, of course, lies in drawing a line between what is ordinary and
what is extraordinary.
Thus, as a general proposition, the CEO usually will not have sufficient inherent authority
by virtue of his office to create the apparent authority necessary to enter into this kind of
relationship with an investment banking firm (that is, to select the firm who will serve as lead
underwriter for the company's IPO). This is because within most corporations this decision
is likely to be viewed as "extraordinary" and not within the company's "ordinary course of
business." As such, the investment banking firm could not reasonably expect that the CEO
could make this selection on his own authority and consequently, there would be no basis for
establishing apparent authority on the part of the CEO to unilaterally decide who will serve
as the lead underwriter for the company's IPO. All of which means that the underwriter who
spins shares out to the CEO is left in the much more attenuated position of hoping for a
return of the favor-the expectation of a quid pro quo-in other words, the mere hope that the
CEO will use his influence to steer the Board to select this investment banker as the
company's lead underwriter. Under these circumstances, it would seem very difficult to
establish a "relationship" of the type that would trigger disclosure under Item 508 of
Regulation S-K. Indeed, this conclusion seems to have been borne out by the failure of the
government to bring any fraud or other enforcement action against any underwriter,
notwithstandingreports of SEC investigations into the practice of spinning. As the Wall Street
Journal reports:
After the Journal's "spinning" disclosures, for instance, the SEC's enforcement
division, both in Washington and in the New York office, launched full-blown
investigations into the matter. But after reviewing a number of potential cases,
the SEC realized how difficult it would be to prove a violation of federal
securities law, according to people familiar with the matter.... The SEC, as is
its custom, declines to discuss specific cases. And it's rare for the agency to
formally close cases, so it's impossible to predict what future enforcement
actions, if any, it is likely to make.
Gasparino et al., supra note 2, at C1.
29. This analysis should be essentially the same for both corporate officers and directors
and therefore, in this Article, the term "managers" will be used to refer to both corporate
officers and directors. Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., A Positive Analysis of the Common Law
ofCorporateFiduciary Duties, 84 KY.L.J. 455, 456 n.2 (1996) ("[Some cases make distinctions
between the fiduciary duties of officers and directors. ... Nonetheless, the basic principles
applied to actions by officers and directors are the same, and thus the two groups are treated
as one.").
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This may be a sound conclusion for the further reason that the
underwriter's allocation practice may be regarded as a generally
accepted business practice within the investment banking industry,
similar to a Robertson Stephens paying for the CEO's greens fee
when the investment banker invites the company's managers to go
golfing. Although no one has ever suggested that the underwriter's
prior payment of the CEO's greens fee gives rise to a "material
relationship" that must be disclosed in the company's prospectus,
the practice of spinning, on the other hand, does seem to rest on
quite different footing. For many observers, spinning activity is seen
as tantamount to "corporate bribery."30 This differing perception is
further reflected in the fact that the NASD ultimately responded to
the publicity surrounding press reports of spinning activity by
proposing a rulemaking initiative,3' whereas, to the best of my
knowledge, the payment of greens fees has not prompted any
rulemaking initiative on the part of the NASD. The NASD's
proposed rulemaking to deal with the practice of spinning is
discussed in the next section.
B. Does Spinning Violate the NASD's Withholding and Free-
Riding Rules?
In response to certain well-publicized events of spinning, such as
Mr. Cayre's flipping of Pixar's hot IPO shares, the NASD proposed
to amend its Rules of Fair Practice as they relate to hot IPOs.32 AS
will be demonstrated in this section, the NASD's current
'3M Coffee, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that spinning "practices are fraught with obvious
conflicts of interest-and in extreme cases could even amount to commercial bribery")
(emphasis added); Adam Lashinsky, ANew Spin on IPO Spinning, SAN JOSE MERCURYNEWS,
Mar. 2, 1998, at 1E ("[S]ome say the investment bankers are bribing the CEO's to win future
investment banking fees.") (emphasis added); Siconolfi, SEC Broadens, supra note 26, at C1
("'It's a black-and-white corporate bribery issue,' contends Steven Wallman, a recently
departed SEC commissioner.") (emphasis added); Michael Siconolfi, "Spinning" of Hot IPOs
is Probed, WALL ST.J., Apr. 16,1998, at C15 (noting that the practice of"spinning'sure smells
like whatever commercial bribery is,' says Mr. [Edward] Fleischman," a former SEC
Commissioner) (emphasis added).
31. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing the NASD's pending
rulemaking proposal to address the practice of spinning).
32. Terzah Ewing, NASD Adopts Bar to Hot IPO Shares for Some Investors, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 8, 1999, at C20 ("The [NASD] approved a rule change" that "would take a step toward
reducing the practice of IPO 'spinning.").
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rulemaking proposal suggests that the underwriters' practice of
spinning raises a set of concerns that are significantly and
qualitatively different than the situation where the underwriter has
merely paid the greens fee of the CEO while on a golfing outing.
Indeed, the practice of spinning seems to conjure up unpleasant
images that, at the very least, imply that underwriters harbor
expectations of a quid pro quo from corporate managers who
personally benefit from the underwriter's spinning practices.33 All
of this seems to have led the NASD to become concerned as to
whether the lead underwriter is fulfilling its obligations of fair
dealing and fair practice under the NASD Rules when it engages in
spinning activity.34 To understand the nature of the NASD's
33. As the NASD has seen fit to address the practice of spinning by announcing
rulemaking activity to amend its Rules of Fair Practice, it seems fair to conclude that
spinning by underwriters smacks of a certain kind of unseemliness that is suggestive of such
a quid pro quo. See infra notes 34,46-48 and accompanying text. But it seems to me that all
this rulemaking activityignores the more fundamental question of why this spinning activity
violates our sensibilities in such a way as to demand the intervention of the NASD. I believe
the more fundamental problem is one of business ethics, including the ethics of corporate
managers. Most disturbing is that this issue has tended (so far at least) to be ignored, with
public debate focusing on the underwriter's allocation decisions and NASD efforts to curb the
practice of spinning, thereby avoiding altogether any discussion of the unseemliness of the
manager's conduct and whether his conductviolates standards of business ethics as developed
under modem fiduciary duty law. "In the three months since The Wall Street Journal first
gave a name to the common but unpublicized practice, all attention regarding spinning has
been on the investment banks .... However, the CEOs who take the bait have caught far less
flack than the [investment] banks." Lashinsky, supra note 30, at 1E.
34. This line of inquiry also raises issues of materiality. In other words, the underwriter's
payment of the CEO/manager's greens fee may be widely viewed as a generally accepted
business practice, and therefore, it does not give rise to an "arrangement or understanding"
within the meaning of Item 508(c)(2) of Regulation S-K A different result might be reached,
however, if the facts were to show that, instead of paying a greens fee, the underwriter had
paid to host an all-expense paid one-week trip for the CEO/manager to visit Paris, France.
The materiality of the CEO'shnanager's decision to accept an all-expense paid trip to Paris
seems much clearer to me. Why? Because the quidpro quo seems self-evident-otherwise why
else would the investment banker bestow such a lavish gift on this CEO/manager? But again,
this discussion seems to overlook another equally important aspect, which is the business
ethics of the CEO/manager who accepts the underwriters payment of the greens fee versus
the CEO/manager who accepts the underwriter's payment of an all-expense paid trip to visit
Paris versus the CEO/manager who accepts the allocation of shares that the underwriter
decides to spin out to the personal trading account of the CEO/manager. The notion that there
is-or might be-a difference between paying the greens fee of a CEO/manager who
accompanies the investment banker on a golf outing, on the one hand, and the underwriter's
practice of spinning, on the other hand, seems rather obvious. But this difference is not nearly
so obvious to others. So, for example, "Cristina Morgan, Hambrecht & Quist's managing
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concerns regarding spinning, this section first offers a brief overview
of the terms of the NASD's existing Free-Riding Rule and the
underlying policy premise for this rule. This section then analyzes
how the NASD currently interprets its existing Free-Riding Rule as
applied to the practice of spinning. Finally, this section closes by
briefly examining the terms of the NASD's pending proposal to
amend its Free-Riding Rule in light of recent spinning activity.
1. General Background Regarding the NASD Free-Riding Rule
By way of general background, what are known as the NASD
Free-Riding and Withholding Rules serve to regulate the sale of "hot
issues"-generally defined as IPOs that immediately trade at a
premium when the shares open for trading in the secondary
market.' The Free-Riding Rule emanates from Rule 2110 of the
NASD (Conduct) Rules of Fair Practices, which operates in the form
of a general exhortation to NASD members, demanding that they
"observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade."36 Immediately following this provision is the
NASD interpretation of how this general standard applies to the
distribution of public offerings."7 In applying its Free-Riding Rule,
the NASD starts from the basic premise "that members have an
obligation to make a bona fide public distribution at the public
offering price of securities which trade at a premium in the
secondary market."' In effect, the NASD assumes that a member's
failure to make a bona fide offering may be viewed as an attempt to
director of investment banking, isn't worried. The San Francisco firm is an active spin player,
but she sees nothing wrong with the practice, likening it to such perks as free golf outings."
Siconolfi, supra note 3, at Al. But see infra notes 105-88 and accompanying text (analyzing
whether the CEO's conduct in accepting hot IPO allocations may not be viewed as an
acceptable business practice from the perspective of the corporation, and therefore may give
rise to a claim that the CEO has breached a fiduciary duty to the corporation by usurping a
corporate opportunity, which in turn may create disclosure problems for both the CEO and
the underwriter when the CEO's company later goes public using that underwriter).
35. See 3B BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 19, § 8:59.
36. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., MANUAL, at IM-2110-1(a)(1)
(1998) [hereinafter NASD MANUAL], available at http'//secure.nasdr.com.
37. Id. at IM-2110-(a)(2). This NASD interpretation is referred to as the "Free-Riding
Rule," although it is not technically an NASD rule.
38. Id. at IM-2110-1(a)(1).
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manipulate the market price for the issuer's securities. 9
Accordingly, free riding is viewed by the NASD as "inconsistent with
high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade."' ° On these grounds, the NASD has interpreted
the general standard of Rule 2110 to prohibit free riding in order to
protect "public confidence in the fairness of the investment banking
and securities business."'1
Generally speaking, the NASD Free-Riding Rule regulates the
sale of shares of a "hot issue," which the NASD has determined to
be a new issue where "after completion of the distribution, the stock
commences trading at a premium above its offering price."' Under
long-standing NASD interpretation, this rule has been applied to
regulate broker-dealer selling practices in the context of a "hot
IPO"' regardless of whether the broker-dealer is acting as an
underwriter or as a selling group member in the offering process."
Consequently and not surprisingly, the NASD Free-Riding Rule has
always prohibited the sale of "hot issue" shares to the personal
account of the employees, officers, directors, partners, or agents of
the NASD member serving as an underwriter of the hot issue."
39. Id-
40. Id. at IM-2110-1(b).
41. Id. at IM-2110-1(aX1). As a leading commentator has observed, an NASD member
serving as lead underwriter for a hot IPO and coming into possession of material, nonpublic
information regarding the extent to which a public offering is oversubscribed finds itself in
essentially the same position as "a stock exchange specialist who knows that there is an
imbalance between buy and sell orders reaching its post, and so both are restricted in their
ability to trade on such information." Coffee, supra note 7, at 5. As such, the NASD member
who is participating in a public offering "should not be able to exploit the information it
possesses that the offering is oversubscribed (and hence the aftermarket price will rise)." Id
42. 3B BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 19, § 8:59.
As to an offering that is greatly in demand, it is often necessary to restrict
allotments to less than the number of shares members of the selling and
underwriting groups are willing to purchase. In such event, the security is likely
to trade at a substantial premium above the offering price on the first day of
tradingwhich is frequently the offering date. Issues that trade at a premium are
characterized as "hot issues," and in certain market periods, speculative frenzy
and the very prospect of new issues trading at a premium create a new-issue
market which is essentially a hot-issue market.
Id.
43. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
44. 3B BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 19, § 8:60 (citing prior NASD enforcement
cases finding underwriter violations of the Free-Riding Rule).
45. Although the NASD Free-Riding Rule casts a wide net, it does not speak to another
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In addition, the NASD member is likewise restricted in the sale
of"hot issue" shares to similar categories of persons who are persons
associated with any other NASD member.' The clear premise
underlying this restriction is the familiar problem of "mutual back-
scratching." In other words, the NASD is concerned that norms of
reciprocity might otherwise develop: "You give me an allocation in
your hot issues, and I will do the same for you in mine."' Thus, the
long-standing concern of the NASD-and the concern that clearly
animates its Free-Riding Rule-is firmly rooted in the NASD's
continuing efforts to regulate the business ethics of its members by
discouraging practices that might lead to an overt expectation of a
quid pro quo."
practice prevalent among underwriters in today's IPO market, namely, the increasing use of
"lock-ups."
Under the "lockup" period, typically lasting six months, so-called insiders are
barred from immediately selling shares in a newly public company .... Lockup
agreements, made between Wall Street underwriters and company insiders, are
designed to attract and protect IPO investors by stabilizing stock prices
following the [IPO] offering through a more orderly sale of [insidersl shares.
(When lockup periods expire, insiders often rush to sell [their] shares and realize
their profits, which can pressure stock prices.).
Cassell Bryan-Low, Some IPO "Lockups" Worked as Intended, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2001, at
C1. The use of lockups is a fairly recent Wall Street innovation that only really came into its
own in the heyday of the hot IPO market of the late 1990s. "Lockups aren't mandated bylaw.
Rather, underwriters use them to reassure other [IPO] investors that the people who know
a particular company best won't be selling out as soon as [the company] is public." Raymond
Hennessey, Longer Lockups May Not Avert Sell-Offs by Anxious Investors, WALL ST. J., Nov.
27, 2000, at C19. How do these agreements work so as to provide some measure of
reassurance to investors who buy the company's stock in an IPO? "Before a company holds an
IPO, insiders, such as company executives and venture capitalists, typically sign lockup
agreements saying they won't sell their shares until a certain period after the offering, usually
180 days." Id. In this way, investors in an IPO gain some comfort that insiders are not simply
going to "cash in" their shares by immediately selling their holdings into the aftermarket, a
particular danger if the offering is a hot IPO that immediately doubles or triples over the
offering price. One investment organization explained:
This is bad news for corporate insiders, but not for investors. That's because the
restrictions are intended to be an incentive for executives "to create value for the
long run, rather than profiting from a quick pop after the IPO," says Patrick
McGurn, vice president of Institutional Shareholder Services of Rockville, Md.,
which advises institutional investors on proxy issues.
Bryan-Low, supra, at C1.
46. Free-Riding Rule, in NASD MANUAL, supra note 36, at IM-2110-1(b).
47. Coffee, supra note 7, at 5.
48. See Michael Siconolfi, NASD Warns on "Spinning" IPO Shares, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24,
1997, at Cl ("The purpose of the [Free-Riding Rule] is to ensure that investment banks don't
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In addition to restricting sales to certain persons associated
with the underwriter or with any other NASD members, the NASD
has also construed its Free-Riding Rule to prohibit the sale of
shares of a "hot issue" to "any senior officer of a bank, savings
and loan institution, insurance company, investment company,
investment advisory firm, or any other institutional account
(including, but not limited to, hedge funds, investment partnerships
... [and] investment clubs)."49 By extending the prohibition of its
use hot IPO shares to reward people who are in a position to direct future business to the
investment bank. The NASD ... wants 'to make sure that hot issues are sold genuinely as
bona-fide public offerings,' says Elisse Walter, chief operating officer of NASD's regulatory
arm.-).
49. Free-Riding Rule, in NASD MANUAL supra note 36, at IM-2110-1(b)(4). By way of
general summary, the existing NASD Free-Riding Rule prohibits the sale of shares in a "hot
issue" to the following categories of persons:
(i) persons associated with the [participatingNASD] member or another broker-
dealer or their family members,(ii) persons who were finders with respect to the
public offering, (iii) persons actingin a fiduciary capacity (such as underwriter's
counsel) to the managing underwriter, and (iv) senior officers of [institutional]
entities such as banks, investment companies [Le., mutual funds], investment
advisory firms or other institutional types of accounts, and/or others who are
involved in or influence the buying and selling of securities for those types of
entities. Exceptions to the prohibitions require that the NASD member be
prepared to show that the securities were sold to the restricted person in
accordance with the restricted person's normal investment practice as a
customer of the [NASD] member, in insubstantial amounts and in amounts not
disproportionate to sales to members of the public.
Meshulam, supra note 18, at 4. The application of the last category of the NASD
rule--subpart (iv) above-was illustrated in a recent SEC administrative decision that grew
out of a controversy closely related to the practice of spinning, even though the dispute
centered on facts that predate the hot IPO frenzy of the late 1990s. In Monetta Financial
Services, Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9546,32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 434,2000
WL 320457 (SEC 2000), Chief Administrative Law Judge Brenda P. Murray held that "an
advisor, portfolio manager, [mutual] fund director and [mutual] fund trustee committed fraud
when the portfolio manager allocated IPO shares to the director's and trustees personal
accounts without making proper disclosures." Dixie L. Johnson et al., Hot IPOs: The Dangers
of Both Giving and Receiving, in PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No.
BO-OOJA, 509, 511 (2000). Based on this spinning activity, Chief Judge Murray ruled that
"f[the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence" was that these allocations
had been made to the personal trading accounts of these mutual fund insiders "because these
[insiders] could further the business interests' of the portfolio manager making the
allocations, thereby implying the finding of a quid pro quo. Monetta Financial, supra; see also
Johnson et al., supra, at 511 (discussing Monetta Financial). The decision, the "first
enforcement case to address spinning since press reports first published in 1997 focused
attention on this practice," id, is not directly related to the spinning practices that are
discussed in this Article since Monetta Financial involved decisions that were made in the
mutual fund context as to how to allocate hot IPO shares that had been received in fifty-one
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Free-Riding Rule to these other persons, the NASD is reflecting its
concern "that hot issue stock could be used as a commercial bribe to
induce such persons to cause the entity they serve [such as a mutual
fund, pension fund, etc.] to buy securities in weaker offerings from
the same underwriter."0 I should point out, though, that sales by an
NASD member to these other persons-who are related to an
"institutional type account"-are only conditionally restricted under
the current NASD interpretation of its Free-Riding Rule. Shares of
a hot IPO may therefore be sold to such persons if the NASD
member
is prepared to demonstrate that the securities were sold to such
persons in accordance with their normal investment practice,
that the aggregate of the securities sold is insubstantial and not
disproportionate in amount as compared to sales to members of
the public and that the amount sold to any one of such persons
is insubstantial in amount.5'
IPOs over an eight-month period in 1993. The AU found that these shares had been allocated
"to the personal accounts of" several mutual fund directors and flipped in first day trading for
repeated quick profits, id. at 512, giving rise to numerous violations of the federal securities
laws, includingviolations of the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, and the Investment Advisors Act. See
also Michael Siconolfi & Robert McGough, SEC Case Against Fund Firm May Influence
"Spinning" Probe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1998, at C1. In light of the provisions of federal
securities laws, fund "directors are, by law, supposed to look out for the fiduciary interests of
fund investors ... . Given these roles, [fund] directors aren't supposed to have 'material
business relationships that would impair their independence,' said Julie Allecta, a partner at
the San Francisco office of law firm Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker." Id- at C27. It is
worth emphasizing that this lawyer, Ms. Allecta, could only reach this conclusion if she were
confident that the courts would continue to vigorously enforce fiduciary duty law. Of course,
in the Monetta Financial case, this concern has been virtually eliminated because Congress
has mandated certain fiduciary standards for fund directors by express provision in the
Investment Advisor Act.
What is most interesting for purposes of my story regarding spinning activity is that
Monetta Financial "can fairly be read... to find violations of law not in the allocations, or the
acceptances, but in the failure to disclose them." Johnson et al., supra, at 511 (emphasis
added). This conclusion has particular relevance to the underwriters' practice of spinning out
shares to corporate executives such as Mr. Cayre. See infra notes 85-188 and accompanying
text (discussing potential violations of federal securities law as well as violations of state
common law of fiduciary duty as a result of the failure to disclose underwriters' practice of
spinning out shares to corporate executives).
50. Coffee, supra note 7, at 38.
51. Free-Riding Rule, in NASD Manual, supra note 36, at IM-2110-1(b)(5) (1998).
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Later in the interpretation, the NASD defines the terms "normal
investment practice" and "disproportionate amount." The NASD
defines "normal investment practice" to refer to similar sized
purchases in a public offering made by one of these conditionally
restricted persons within the prior year. 2 In addition, the NASD
suggests a ten-percent guideline as the standard for determining
whether a "disproportionate" allocation is being made to the account
of a conditionally restricted person.5
2. Applying the NASD Free-Riding Rule to the Practice of
Spinning
It is in this context that one must consider the NASD's first public
response to the controversy over spinning, which was issued in
December 1997, a scant month after publication of the Wall Street
Journal article detailing Mr. Cayre's relationship with Robertson
Stephens. The NASD's first response took the form of a notice to its
members reminding them of their obligations under the existing
NASD Free-Riding Rule and the NASD's longstanding inter-
pretations thereunder.' As part of its Notice, the NASD indicated
that members could be subject to sanctions for allocating shares of
hot IPOs to the personal brokerage accounts of fund managers of
"institutional type" accounts, such as individual managers of
venture capital firms. The Notice did not suggest, however, that the
NASD Free-Riding Rule would apply to the allocation of shares to
executives of private companies who are in a position to influence
the selection of an underwriter for the forthcoming IPO at their
respective companies, such as Mr. Cayre of GT Interactive
Software.55
In its Free-Riding Policy, the NASD clearly reflects its concern
that its members might be tempted to use hot IPO allocations to
recruit future business from persons in the financial services
industry. This concern is particularly apparent in the NASD
warning that investment banks could be subject to sanctions for
allocating shares of IPOs to the personal brokerage accounts of
52. Id- at IM-2110-1(bX4).
53. Id. at IM-2110-1(b)(9)(A).
54. NASD Notice to Members 97-91, 1997 WL 1909870 (Dec. 1997).
55. Id; NASD Notice to Members 98-48 (Aug. 1998).
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venture capitalists.5 6 The NASD's long-standing concern over
problems of "mutual back-scratching" apparently now extends to
include individuals associated with the venture capital industry,
another segment of the financial services industry. So, in its
December 1997 Notice, the NASD put its members on notice that
the NASD was worried that members, when serving as
underwriters, might allocate hot IPO shares to the personal
accounts of venture capitalists "in the hope that the venture
capitalists would be in a position to influence the companies in
which they held interests to use the brokerage firm for an IPO if the
companies decided to go public."" The NASD Notice, however,
56. Cross & Roberts, supra note 23, at 598. On the other hand, it would appear that
current NASD policy would allow for allocations of "hot IPO" shares to the personal accounts
of individuals associated with these venture capital firms if the allocations were not
"disproportionate" and otherwise complied with NASD criteria for "normal investment
practice." See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing these defined terms).
57. Cross & Roberts, supra note 23, at 598. As a largely unregulated element of the
financial services industry, the venture-capitalist community quickly moved to lobby their
members to avoid the practice of "spinning" and the appearance of impropriety that it thereby
created. According to a 1997 article published in the Wall Street Journal:
Venture capitalists who accept hot initial public stock offerings and quickly
sell them for a profit could be skating on thin regulatory ice.
That's the conclusion of a memorandum prepared for the National Venture
Capital Association, an Arlington, Va., trade group, by an outside law firm.
The memo, written last year but previously unpublished, underscores the
broad concern outside Wall Street with investment banks allocating "directed
shares" of hot IPOs to the personal accounts of corporate executives and venture
capitalists-and selling the shares on the day of the IPO for fast profits-in an
apparent bid for business from the executives' firms....
"At a minimum," the memo said, receiving such shares "would be tainted with
the appearance of impropriety."
[In an apparent reaction to these concerns], some venture-capital firms have
stopped accepting such IPO shares in the memo's wake, including [the well-
known venture capital firm] Sequoia Partners in Menlo Park, Calif.
Michael Siconolfi, Venture Capitalists Get a Stern Warning on "Spinning" IPOs, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 17, 1997, at C16.
This informal lobbying effort can be seen as a shrewd move on the part of the venture-
capital industry, which presumably feared that continued publicity of spinning practices-at
least insofar as they involved allocation to venture capitalists-might invite more scrutiny,
which ultimately might lead to greater regulation of the venture capital industry, by either
the NASD, the SEC, or both. This concern is reflected in the observations made in the same
Wall Street Journal article:
Not to mention a black eye for the venture-capital community, one of corporate
America's biggest success stories of the 1990s. "If it became a prevalent industry
practice and were to draw the attention of the limited partner community or
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financial press, trading in and flipping of 'directed shares' byventure capitalists
could create a public relations issue for the industry," the memo warned.
The memo's message for venture capitalists: "Times are good. Let's all not get
greedy, and remember an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," Carl
Thoma, Chairman of the trade group, said in an interview.
At issue, among other things, is the [NASD] "Free-Riding and Withholding
Rule." The purpose of the rule is to ensure that investment banks don't use hot
IPO shares to reward people who are in a position to direct future business to
the investment bank.
"A conservative, literal reading" of the rule would "appear to preclude an
NASD member from allocating any'directed shares' in a hot issue to anyventure
capitalists," the memo said. Though the [Free-Riding] rule essentially applies to
the underwriter, "prudence dictates that the venture industry avoid the
appearance of any conflict or impropriety," the memo said.
Here's the specific concern forventure capitalists: If an executive [ofaventure
capital firm] accepted IPO shares in his personal account from an underwriter,
the memo said, "with the express or implied understanding that the 'quid pro
quo' for such purchase opportunity would be to place such underwriter on a
'short list" of candidates to receive future business from the venture capitalist's
[portfolio] firm, there could be a problem.
[What's more, w]hen the venture capitalist flips those IPO shares for a quick
profit, he "has improperly used his position of influence within his firm for
personal gain," the memo said. "It is possible as well that he has breached the
terms of his partnership agreement."
James F. Morgan, former Chairman of the trade group's standards committee,
said in a note to members accompanying the memo: Accepting such IPO shares
creates "the potential of regulatory or cosmetic conflicts of interests."
Id.
What is most important about this memo's warning to venture capitalists is its clear
acknowledgement of the potential conflict-of-interest problem inherent in the practice of
spinning along with the memo's passing reference to the "limited partner community." As
developed more fully in Part III, the practice of spinning gives rise to a potential claim for
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of corporate managers, which is the focus of this Article.
But, interestingly enough, the venture capital community apparently realized the potential
for this type of conflict-of-interest claim long before the story of spinning became "the subject
of recent articles in the Wall Street Journal." Id. Part of the concern about attracting the
attention of the limited partner community would appear to stem from the notion that these
limited partners may well view the venture capitalist's receipt of hot IPO shares as an
improper use of their (fiduciary) position within the firm in order to gain personal financial
advantage. This sounds like the venture capitalists anticipate that their investors-"the
limited partner community"-may well view this practice as disappointing the expectations
that these limited partner investors have with respect to the kind of fair and ethical practices
they expect as to the conduct ofcofporate managers who find themselves in a position similar
to Mr. Cayre. It seems fair to assume that the trade association anticipates that these
investors may well take action to hold venture capitalists who accept hot IPO allocations
responsible for this type of abuse of position within the firm. This memo arguably reflects the
tacit acknowledgement that there may very well be grounds for finding a breach of fiduciary
duty as a result of spinning activity-which is, after all, the point of this Article. See infra,
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does not suggest that the [Free-Riding] rule would apply to the
allocation of shares to executives of private companies who are
in a position to select an underwriter for an upcoming IPO
(assuming that the executive is not otherwise in the category of
persons subject to the Free-Riding and Withholding Rule), even
though the same problem of "mutual back-scratching" would
seem to be equally present in this situation as well.'
Despite what appears at first blush to be a gaping loophole in the
scheme of NASD regulation of hot IPOs, "this does not mean that
anything goes."59 The NASD Free-Riding Rule also prohibits
"withholding" shares of a hot IPO, a practice that is closely related
to "spinning." Withholding refers to the underwriter practice of
allocating shares in a hot IPO to the personal account of a favored
client, such as Mr. Cayre of GT Interactive, after secondary trading
in the shares has commenced. Like spinning, withholding is seen as
an inherently deceptive practice because the trading price in the
secondary market is based on the assumption that the public float
consists of all the shares registered in the offering, when in fact
some portion has been "withheld" from the public offering process.
Thus, to the extent that Mr. Cayre was allocated shares of Pixar's
hot IPO after trading in Pixar's shares had commenced, for example,
the underwriter probably would have violated the NASD's inter-
pretation of Rule 2110 by virtue of "withholding" the hot IPO shares
in order to allocate these shares at the IPO price "to a preferred
customer when the aftermarket price [was] already higher.' 6°
notes 105-88 and accompanying text (for further development of the idea that spinning
inherently involves a breach of fiduciary duty because it violates investors' reasonable
expectations as to standards of fair and ethical business practices in today's business
environment).
58. Cross & Roberts, supra note 23, at 598.
59. Coffee, supra note 7, at 5 (emphasis added).
60. Id. The expectation of a quid pro quo in this setting seems particularly self-evident,
unlike some other cases involving spinning out hot IPO allocations as part of the IPO
distribution process. Where the allocation is made after Secondary trading in the security has
commenced and the stock is already trading at a premium over its fixed offering price in the
IPO, the spinning activity seems to be nothing short of a tacit "commercial bribe." The NASD
Free-Riding Rule "probably does reach and preclude the most egregious abuse in the current
'spinning' investigation: namely, the allocation of shares at the initial offering price to a
preferred customer when the aftermarket price is already higher." Id.; see also Randall Smith
2046 [Vol. 43:2023
2002 SPINNING IN A HOT IPO-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY? 2047
In response to the controversy over the practice of spinning, the
NASD proposed to amend its Free-Riding Rule as applied to "hot
issues." " In October 1999, the NASD filed a proposal with the SEC
to adopt a new rule,6 2 Rule 2790, which, if adopted, would replace
the existing NASD interpretation of its Free-Riding Rule as applied
to hot IPOs. This rule proposal has been amended twice, and the
most recent amendment, which took place in January 2000,
addressed concerns raised by NASD members as part of the public
comment to proposed Rule 2790.'
In this most recent rulemaking proposal, the NASD indicated
that its primary concern is the impact that "spinning" has on the
integrity of the public offering system:
The[Free-Riding Rule] is designed to protect the integrity of the
public offering process by ensuring that [NASD] member firms
make a bona fide public offering of securities at the public
offering price and that none are withheld for the firms benefit or
to reward individuals in the position to direct future business to
the [NASD] firm."
Thus, the concern that led the NASD to propose its new Free-Riding
Rule remains essentially the same as originally led it to promulgate
its policy in this area. Its efforts, however, to stretch the language
of its original formulation of its policy to embrace the myriad set of
concerns that had been raised as a result of the recent spinning
controversy ultimately led the NASD to formalize its policy into a
& Susan Pulliam, SEC Seeks Wall Street Firms' Records on Stock Purchases as Part oflPO
Probe, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30,2001, at C1 ("The after-market order inquiry is an out-growth of
an active IPO investigation by the SEC, as well as the U.S. Attorney in Manhattan and the
regulatory unit of the [NASD], according to people familiar with that probe.") (emphasis
added).
61. See Trading in Hot Equity Offerings, 65 Fed. Reg. 2656 (proposed Jan. 18, 2000) (to
be codified as NASD Rule 2790).
62. See generally LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION (4th ed. 2001) (providing a general description of SEC review of NASD
rulemaldng).
63. Trading in Hot Equity Offerings, 65 Fed. Reg. 2656 (proposed Jan. 18, 2000) (to be
codified as NASD Rule 2790).
64. Press Release, NASD, NASD Board of Governers Approves Rule Proposed for Trading
in Hot Equity Offerings (Oct. 7, 1999), available at http:/www.nasdr.com/newsfprl999/
ne_section99_236.html.
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new free-standing rule of more comprehensive scope than its pre-
existing Free-Riding interpretation.
Most significant for purposes of this Article's discussion of
spinning is that proposed Rule 2790, as amended, would eliminate
the term "hot issue" or "hot IPO" and instead apply the restrictions
of the Free-Riding Rule to all initial public offerings of equity
securities. By extending the proposed Free-Riding Rule to all IPOs,
the NASD eliminates the difficulties traditionally associated with
defining the term "hot issue." Under the current Free-Riding Rule,
a difficult threshold issue lies in determining whether a particular
public offering constitutes a "hot issue" that is subject to the NASD
Free-Riding Rule. In practice, the NASD Compliance Department
usually has the responsibility of reviewing aftermarket quotations
to determine whether a particular security is a "hot issue." As
revised, proposed Rule 2790 eliminates the requirement that the
stock trade at a "premium" in the aftermarket, thereby eliminating
the threshold determination whether a particular public offering is
a "hot IPO." Thus, a stock that sold at a fixed offering price of $15
in the IPO that begins trading at $15 1/32 in the aftermarket is a
hot issue that is subject to the free-riding restrictions of proposed
Rule 2790.'
Proposed Rule 2790 clarifies many of the ambiguities under the
existing free-riding interpretation, particularly as to IPO allocations
made to accounts of individuals who are currently treated as
"conditionally restricted persons." The NASD's proposed rule,
however, continues existing policy in that it does not address sales
65. See 3B BLOOmENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 19, §§ 8:60.1 to :60.2.
66. Proposed Rule 2790
... is designed to eliminate confusion over whether certain investors are
restricted from receiving shares in hot stock deals, Gary Goldscholle, assistant
general counsel at NASD Regulation, said....
If the proposed new rule takes effect, invididuals responsible for managing
other people's money would be barred from getting shares in a hot stock issue,
according to the NASD.
That would prohibit hedge-fund managers, investment advisers and some
venture-capital managers from receiving shares from such deals in their
personal brokerage accounts, the NASD said....
Most venture capitalists won't be restricted under the new rule, because they
don't manage pools of money from outside investors.
Ewing, supra note 32, at C20.
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made to individuals who are not related to the financial services
industry, such as a Mr. Cayre, but who clearly fall within the policy
rationale that underlies Rule 2790 and its predecessor Free-Riding
Rule-that is, the concern that an allocation to a Mr. Cayre might
be used as a quid pro quo to influence the CEO/manager to direct
their company's underwriting business to that NASD member.
In the face of what some consider to be a gaping loophole, at least
one commentator has suggested that the most simple and most
expedient way to eliminate the pernicious practice of spinning hot
IPO shares out to individuals, such as Mr. Cayre, would be to
further regulate the underwriter, as the gatekeeper for this
practice." Thus, the suggestion has been made that the NASD
Free-Riding Rule should reach more broadly-to restrict allocations
to officers, directors, and agents of significant clients of the
underwriter." Under this suggestion, corporate managers, such
as Mr. Cayre, apparently would be treated by underwriters in
essentially the same way as individuals associated with a venture
capital firm are currently treated under the existing NASD Free-
Riding Rule. Thus, allocations of hot IPOs presumably could be
made to the personal accounts of these corporate managers provided
that such allocations were consistent with the individual's "normal
investment practice."6 9
One criticism of this approach is that it continues the practice of
relying on the broker-dealer community to police their clients,
extending it now to include monitoring the business ethics of those
brokerage clients who also happen to be corporate fiduciaries. At
a minimum, if we decide to pursue this approach in order to
address potential abuses arising out of the practice of spinning, this
effort should not eliminate the possibility of holding the corporate
67. E.g., Coffee, supra note 7. For a fuller analysis of the "gatekeeper" function see Peter
C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate Legal
Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213 (2000) (analyzing the gatekeeper function by extending it to
the role of corporate lawyers in the transactional setting); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers:
The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) (making
the case for lawyers and accountants, among others, serving as "gatekeepers," that is, serving
as reputational intermediaries in third-party enforcement regimes).
68. Coffee, supra note 7. Professor Coffee rejects the notion of a prophylactic rule that
would completely prohibit such allocations on the grounds that it "does not seem necessary."
Id.
69. Id.; see also supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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manager liable for breaching their fiduciary duty to their
corporation when they accept hot IPO shares spun out to personal
accounts by a broker who is acting as an underwriter for a
particular "hot IPO." In this way, the corporate manager can be held
accountable as a corporate fiduciary. Just as the NASD member
firm can defend its allocation decision to this CEO as consistent
with the CEO's "normal investment practice," the CEO may be able
to defend against a breach of fiduciary duty claim by demonstrating
that the hot IPO shares were allocated to them personally as part
of their established investment practices with that broker-dealer
firm and therefore did not constitute a corporate opportunity.70 To
do otherwise is to dilute the fiduciary duty standard that applies to
the CEO's conduct. This is not to say that the NASD Free-Riding
Policy should not extend to underwriter's decisions to allocate hot
IPO shares to individuals such as Mr. Cayre. Any effort, however,
to extend the NASD Free-Riding Policy to corporate managers
should not eliminate-or even reduce in the slightest-the scope of
the manager's fiduciary duty to his or her corporation.
Many market participants believe that spinning has been around
for a long time; but there can be no doubt that it received
heightened scrutiny in the face of an unprecedented wave of hot IPO
activity in the late 1990s. 1 In a market where individual investors
were routinely denied access to hot IPOs, it is not surprising that
broker-dealer allocation practices became the object of a more
intense public scrutiny not generally seen before. Beginning with
the Wall Street Journal article in November 1997, describing the
spinning of Pixar shares to Mr. Cayre, and continuing with
intermittent coverage by the Wall Street Journal and other
publications in the financial press, these broker-dealer practices
were critically examined not only by regulators but by investors as
well.72 Notwithstanding all this controversy surrounding "spinning"
of hot IPO shares out to corporate managers, the NASD's proposed
70. See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
71. "Spinning got going in the 1980s and exploded during the 1990s bull market, as
underwriters began competing fiercely to handle initial offerings." Siconolfi, supra note 3, at
A4.
72. For a description of regulators' investigations, at the SEC, the NASD, and the state
level by NASAA and other state securities officials, criminal investigations rumored to be
undertaken at both the federal level by the U.S. Attorney's office and by local prosecutors in
Manhattan, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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rule amendments do not specifically address decisions by the
underwriter to allocate shares of hot IPOs to executives of
companies that are themselves future IPO candidates.7"
In an interesting turn of events, however, many broker-dealer
firms moved to adopt policies formalizing the firm's decision-making
practices for allocating shares in a hot IPO where the firm serves as
the lead underwriter. Indeed, within a week after the Wall Street
Journal published its story describing the Robertson Stephens
allocation of Pixar's hot IPO shares to Mr. Cayre, Robertson
Stephens announced that it was taking steps
to prevent potential abuses in how it allocates hot new stocks to
corporate executives and venture capitalists. ...
[On Tuesday, November 18, 1997, it] adopted a new policy
requiring that IPO shares be doled out based on a client's
brokerage activity with the firm during the preceding 18
months, according to an internal memo by Michael McCaffery,
president and chief executive officer ....
The move comes as the [SEC] and [NASD] scrutinize the
practice of [spinning] ....
The memo says: "Specifically, the syndicate department will
allocate IPO shares based on a numerical formula and analysis
of a client's brokerage with the firm, excluding the prior
allocation of IPO shares." Previously the investment bank had
no policy on how it allocated IPO shares to individual brokerage
accounts.74
Robertson Stephens, however, was not alone in its reform efforts.
In the wake of this heightened scrutiny of Wall Street allocation
73. The SEC has yet to act on the NASD rule-making proposal. But even if it were to be
approved, the NASD Free-Riding Rule would not prohibit the lead underwriter from spinning
hot IPO shares to a corporate manager's personal trading account, such as Robertson
Stephens did when it acted as lead underwriter for Pixar's IPO and spun out shares to Mr.
Cayre of GT Interactive. So the potential for corporate bribery through this form of
transaction continues, unless the conduct of the corporate manager-GT Interactive's CEO,
Mr. Cayre in this example-is subject to scrutiny for a potential breach of their fiduciary duty
to his or her corporation. This topic is taken up in Part III, see infra notes 105-88 and
accompanying text.
74. Michael Siconolfi & Anita Raghavan, Robertson Stephens Tries to Stop "Spinning" of
Shares of Hot IPOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1997, at C1. According to Mr. McCaffery, "exact
allocations will depend on, among other things, the size and demand for the IPO, as well as
the amount of commissions generated in the brokerage account." Id. at C24.
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practices in hot IPOs, other firms also announced plans to evaluate
their internal policies and procedures for allocating shares of hot
IPOs.75 These efforts presumably were undertaken in order to
eliminate the basis for any perception of a conflict of interest, one
otherwise inherent in the practice of spinning, and to thereby
eliminate the basis for any further public criticism of those firms
that had engaged in such practices.76 Some commentators have even
speculated that the embarrassment resulting from all this media
attention very well may have eliminated any further need for NASD
rulemaking in this area.77
75. Id.; see also id. at Cl ("Several [other] investment banks said they either were re-
examining their practices of allocating IPOs or restating their policies; these [firms] included
Hambrecht & Quist LLC, NationsBank Corp.'s Nationsbanc Montgomery Securities Inc.,
Bankers Trust New York Corp.'s BT Alex. Brown and Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter Discover
& Co.").
76. Concern over the ethics of its prior spinning activity appears to be the driving force
that ultimately led Robertson Stephens to formalize its policy for allocating shares in hot
IPOs. "What we want to avoid is having even the appearance of a conflict of interest,' Mr.
McCaffery said in an interview." Id. at Cl. I elaborate further on the ethical implications of
the story ofspinningin Part IV of this Article. See infra notes 189-202 and accompanyingtext.
77.
Indeed, regulators have said their investigations of future spinning activity
could be limited because the practice has waned in the wake of the [Wall Street]
Journal's scrutiny of the matter. "The focus on spinning has had perhaps the
greatest impact" on stamping out the practice, said Richard Walker, the SEC's
general counsel who recently was tapped to be the [SEC's] new enforcement
chief.
Siconolfi, SEC Broadens, supra note 26, at C15; see also Gasparino et al., supra note 2, at Cl:
[E]xposing abusive practices has been a remedy in itself, [securities] regulators
say. They assert that the media can have a tremendous impact. For example, the
Wall Street Journal disclosed the prevalence of spinning, and the SEC's Mr.
Levitt says the "embarrassment" caused by the disclosure caused "the practice
[of spinning] to disappear almost overnight."
On the other hand, the "disappearance" of the practice of spinning may bejust a reflection of
the deteriorating market for IPO activity since early February 2000. The general "melt down"
of the IPO market has been widely reported for some time now. See, e.g., Suzanne McGee et
al., Cold Springs: Doing an Internet IPO In This Climate Takes Grit, Loudcloud Learns, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 6, 2001, at Al ("In 1999, nearly a quarter of IPOs doubled or better on their first
day. A few rose six and sevenfold. Now, as stocks struggle and Internet highfliers fade, the
IPO market is a cold place."); Riva Richmond, Former IPO Fans Change Their Tune, Vowing
Not to Buy in Lackluster Market, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2000, at C22 ("[T]he once-hot market
in IPOs has iced over as the U.S. stock market has turned treacherous. IPO issuance has
tailed off.. .."). If the current softness in the market for new issues is the real explanation for
the failure of spinning to continue to grab headlines in the financial press, then the need for
NASD intervention in the form of proposed Rule 2790 may still be very real, allowing
regulatory action to be taken in anticipation of the ineVitable rebound in the IPO market.
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C. Does Spinning Constitute Payment of a "Gratuity" in Violation
of NASD Rule 3060?
As a final possibility, some have questioned whether the
underwriter practice of spinning might violate existing NASD Rule
3060, another of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. 8 The terms of
NASD Rule 3060 speak very broadly, purporting to prohibit any
payment or gratuity of more than $100 where such payment is given
"in relation to the business of the employer of the recipient of the
payment."79
At some intuitive level, it would be easy to treat our example of
Pixar shares spun out to Mr. Cayre's personal trading account as
the payment of an illegal gratuity. It would seem, however, that, in
order to establish that spinning constitutes a violation of NASD
Rule 3060, there would need to be some evidence that Mr. Cayre
received this allocation of Pixar shares as a quid pro quo for
directing the underwriting business of his corporation to Pixar's
lead underwriter, Robertson Stephens. This would seem to place the
NASD regulators back into the difficult predicament of proving the
underwriter's motivation for making specific allocation decisions. In
any case, the NASD, at least so far, "has not applied Rule 3060 to
78. Influencing or Rewarding Employees of Others, in NASD MANUAL, supra note 36, at
3060.
79. Id. As an example of the kind of facts that give rise to an alleged violation of this rule,
the Wall Street Journal recently reported:
Federal securities regulators have launched an inquiry into whether a Salomon
Smith Barney broker bribed officials of San Bernardino County, Calif., in
exchange for fees and excessive commissions on more than $7.5 billion of
investments for the county.
The investigation by the [SEC] comes on the heels of a lawsuit filed last
month by the county against the firm [Salomon Smith Barney].... The suit
alleges that the broker, Peter Morrison, bribed county officials with cash, trips
to foreign hot spots [which allegedly included trips to Paris and Greece],
entertainment and dinners....
Wall Street firms have long taken clients from investment firms to dinners
and ballgames, and at times shower them with gifts. But the value of the gifts
can't total more than $100 in a year, and the handouts must not influence the
decision of the investors or municipalities, according to securities regulations.
Gregory Zuckerman, Salomon Smith Barney Broker Faces California Bribery Inquiry, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 26, 2000, at C1.
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sanction [broker-dealer] firms reported to be involved in spinning
activities."0
Despite the NASD's failure to treat spinning as payment of a
prohibited gratuity, this line of analysis has sparked some concern
as to whether spinning is analogous to the "pay-to-play" practices
that were prevalent in the municipal securities industry until the
MSRB promulgated Rule G-37 in 1994.81 "Pay to-play" refers to the
practice of local public officials receiving (as a quid pro quo?)
political contributions from securities firms competing for the
municipal bond underwriting business to be handed out by these
local politicians.8 2
80. Cross & Roberts, supra note 23, at 4.
81. See MUNICIPAL SEcURIES RULEMAKING BOARD, RULE G-37: PoLIcAL
CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS ON MUNICIPAL SECURITIES BUSINESS, available at
http'/Avww.msrb.orgfmsrbl/rules/ruleg37.htm; Political Contributions and Prohibitions on
Municipal Securities Business, 59 Fed. Reg. 3389 (proposed Jan. 12, 1994) (proposing Rule
G-37); Self Regulatory Org., Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd., Exchange Act Release No. 34-33868,
59 Fed. Reg. 17621 (Apr. 13, 1994) (adopting Rule G-37). For background regarding the
municipal securities industry and the SEC's recent (1990) decision to create the MSRB see
generally 3 LOUIS Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1163-78 (3d. ed. rev. 1999)
(tracing historical need for municipal securities issues disclosure); id. at 3086-95 (discussing
the general authority of MSRB and its relation to the SEC).
The "pay-to-play" practices proscribed by Rule G-37 are to be distinguished from another
more recent practice engaged in by Wall Street underwriting firms that also is referred to as
"paying to play." As one commentator explains:
Indeed, "paying to play" is becoming an increasingly common phenomenon in
capital markets. It is happening as commercial banks that have acquired Wall
Street investment banks try to use their lending operations, once considered a
low profit-margin business for the risks involved, as a way to win higher-margin
deals of all other kinds, such as underwriting. That, industry participants say,
is a logical step for banks promoting a "one-stop shopping" concept.
Suzanne McGee, Lucent Rewarded Lenders With Underwriter Roles, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28,
2001, at C1.
82. For general background regarding the MSRB and SEC oversight of its rulemaking
activities see generally COX ET AL., supra note 19, at 543-60. As a general overview of the
scope of Rule G-37, a leading treatise has summarized what is probably among the most
controversial of the SEC's recent regulatory efforts in this area as follows:
To address concerns over campaign contributions by broker-dealers to public
officials who award underwriting business, the [MSRB] adopted Rule G-37,
which restricts "pay to play" practices. The Rule became effective in 1994,
following SEC approval. It prohibits a securities firm from engaging in
municipal securities business with an issuer if the firm, any municipal finance
professional associated with the firm, or any political action committee
controlled by the firm has made political contributions to an official of the issuer
within the previous two years. The Rule has withstood an early constitutional
challenge launched by William Blount, the chairman of the Alabama Democratic
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Some legal commentators have questioned whether spinning is a
form of corporate bribery that should be outlawed in the same way
that Rule G-37 eliminated pay-to-play practices in the municipal
securities industry.' Others believe that the proposed reform of the
NASD Free-Riding Rule, now pending before the SEC, adequately
addresses the current public policy concerns raised by broker-
dealers' spinning practices, thereby obviating any need to adopt a
rule that would prohibit completely the practice of spinning. If any
such prohibition were to be adopted, however, it would serve only to
regulate the practices of NASD members, including those broker-
dealers serving as lead underwriters of hot IPOs, but would not
apply to regulate the conduct of corporate managers such as Mr.
Cayre of GT Interactive Software.' Is a Mr. Cayre, however, any
Party and a municipal securities dealer. See Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
Id. at 545-46.
83. Coffee, supra note 7; Cross & Roberts, supra note 23.
84. At the federal level, the SEC may not have much of an alternative in the context of
"spinning activity" other than to regulate the practices of securities broker-dealers. The SEC's
authority to regulate securities broker-dealers is clear. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§§ 15-1A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 780, 780-03 (2000). The conduct of managers, however, is an area
traditionally the province of state corporate law to regulate, and it may be virtually
impossible, or certainly very difficult, for the SEC to directly regulate spinning practices as
they implicate corporate CEO conduct. The SEC, however, may be tempted in this context,
as it has been in others, to do indirectly that which may be impossible, or at least very
difficult, for the agency to do directly. As but one example, the SEC has used this strategy in
the context of regulating the municipal securities industry.
[I]n 1989, [the SEC] adopted rule 15c2-12, which requires underwriters
participating in municipal offerings of over $10 million to obtain and review the
issuer's disclosure documents and distribute them to investors. Although this
obligation was imposed on underwriters, not issuers, it indirectly requires
issuers to prepare a mandatory disclosure document.... These developments
illustrate a familiar pattern in securities regulation: through its enforcement
and anti-fraud powers, the SEC can accomplish by the back door what it cannot
achieve by the front door-namely, the gradual institutionalization of a
mandatory disclosure system within a particular market....
[The SEC's] strategy is evident here: placing a regulatory burden on the
broker or dealer (who is subject to SEC regulation) to compel a change in
behavior by the municipality (who is largely not).
JENNINGS ErAL., supra note 14, at 15 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
The SEC could monitor the conduct of the broker-dealer community to insure that fair and
ethical business practices are used to distribute securities in the public offering process. This
would include the regulation of the distribution of securities to individuals such as Mr. Cayre,
where the SEC is concerned that sales to such persons may lead to potential conflicts of
interest that might impair the integrity of corporate management. The SEC may decide to
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less culpable in his conduct than the broker who spins hot IPO
shares out to such a corporate manager's personal trading account
as the quid pro quo for that manager using his or her influence to
direct future underwriting business to this broker's firm?
In the next section, the focus of my story, and this Article, shifts
from the underwriter's conduct to that of the individual CEO
receiving the hot IPO allocation. Part II will analyze whether the
conduct of the corporate manager-who accepts an allocation of hot
IPO shares and then flips these shares, earning a quick profit for his
or her own personal trading account-gives rise to any disclosure
issues. Later, Part III analyzes whether this conduct gives rise to a
breach of fiduciary duty.
II. THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATE MANAGER WHO RECEIVES
HOT IPO ALLOCATIONS-DISCLOSURE ISSUES
Analysis of the obligations imposed on broker-dealer firms as
members of the securities business, itself a regulated industry, puts
into sharper focus certain issues with regard to spinning that have
received far less attention to date. The public debate over the
practice of spinning has virtually ignored the question of the
culpability of those corporate managers who profit personally from
these practices. The central focus of this section is to analyze
whether the conduct of the manager, in receiving an allocation of
shares in another company's hot IPO, creates disclosure obligations
under federal securities laws or under relevant state law principles,
either at the time of receiving the shares or at some later date. Part
III addresses the heart of the inquiry into the culpability of the
corporate manager by considering whether the manager's conduct
constitutes the usurpation of a corporate opportunity in breach of
his or her fiduciary duty to the corporation.8 5
promulgate rules that impose a regulatory burden on the underwriter-who is subject to SEC
regulation-in order to compel a change in the behavior ofcorporate management-who is not
directly subject to SEC regulation. Even if this type of federal regulation were to be adopted,
however, it does not eliminate the need to monitor corporate managers to insure that these
individuals abide by standards of fair and ethical conduct under relevant state law fiduciary
principles. Such federal regulation of the broker-dealer community should not operate to
eliminate the traditional authority of states to establish standards of fairness required to
satisfy fiduciary duty obligations of corporate managers.
85. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (describing the impact of the current
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A. Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Laws
The last section, as an example case, focused on whether Item 508
of Regulation S-K requires that the prospectus for GT Interactive's
IPO include disclosure that the company's CEO, Mr. Cayre,
personally received an allocation of shares in another company's hot
IPO that was underwritten by Robertson Stephens, the same
investment banking firm now serving as the lead underwriter for
GT Interactive's IPO.s6 This earlier discussion, however, focused on
this disclosure issue primarily from the lead underwriter
perspective.8 7 Not surprisingly, when the issue is examined from the
company's perspective-as the registrant of the securities to be sold
in the IPO-the analysis under Item 508 yields essentially the same
conclusion. That is to say, the line item disclosure of Regulation S-K
emphasizes the pre-existing relationship between the company and
the investment bank chosen to serve as the lead underwriter for its
IPO. As applied to GT Interactive's IPO, Item 508 focuses on any
financial advice or underwriting services previously rendered by
Robertson Stephens to the company. Because spinning activity does
not directly implicate the company's interests, Mr. Cayre's prior
dealings with his broker, Robertson Stephens, presumably would
not fall directly within the (line item) disclosure mandated by Item
508.8
legal framework regarding spinning practices on the professional responsibilities of
transactional lawyers when advising corporate managers in this context).
86. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure requirements of
Item 508 as applied to distribution practices in Pixar's prospectus for its IPO).
87. The earlier discussion of Item 508 focused on the prospectus disclosure required
(primarily of the underwriter) to provide a description of the plan of distribution for the
securities to be sold in the issuer's IPO. This presents a different set of concerns than are
present when one analyzes the scope of disclosure required by Item 508 from the perspective
of holding managers accountable to the company's investors. See infra notes 90, 100-02 and
accompanying text.
88. In considering these potential disclosure issues, one is reminded of similar issues that
arose in connection with the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s that ultimately led Judge
Sporkin to exclaim, "Where were the lawyers?" Sporkin focused attention on the professional
responsibilities of those transactional lawyers who advised S&L clients amidst some of the
more egregious scandals that arose in the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Likewise, in the context
of spinning, it is important that practicing lawyers do not overlook that spinning practices
may give rise to disclosure issues that go beyond the line-item disclosures required by the
terms of Regulation S-K. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (discussing
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The line item disclosures called for by Regulation S-K do raise a
further line of inquiry as to the scope of disclosure required of the
company and of its managers in the company's prospectus for its
IPO.89 Though not mandated by the terms of Regulation S-K, one
professional responsibilities of lawyers).
89. "Spinning" is a term of art that usually refers to the allocation practices of investment
banking firms that serve as underwriters of hot equity offerings. This is not to be confused
with issuer-sponsored programs generally known as "Directed Share Programs" or "Friends
and Family Programs." In these programs, the investment banks, at the request of the issuer,
allocate a portion of the registered offering to persons whom the issuer may wish to provide
the opportunity to participate in the offering, such as the issuer's business partners,
employees and their families or friends. Although directed-share programs may seem to
resemble spinning in that both involve decisions as to how to allocate stock in an IPO,
directed-share programs are issuer-sponsored and, as such, are not initiated by the
underwriters, whose involvement is generally limited to administering the directed-share
program. The registration statement typically contains disclosure in the Plan of Distribution
regarding the existence of such programs, including the number of shares of the offering that
are subject to the directed-share program, the nature of the participants (e.g., the issuer's
suppliers), and whether the directed-share participants are subject to lock-up agreements.
In recent years, another type of issuer-sponsored IPO allocation practice has evolved.
Investors, particularly venture capital firms investing in start-ups, have increasingly
bargained for the right to purchase shares in the IPOs of their portfolio companies "as
sweeteners in consideration for their investment in [this portfolio] company." See Michael E.
Lubowitz and Erika L. Weinberg, IPO Participation Rights, INSIGHTs, July 2000, at 7. The
right to purchase stock in the company's IPO is generally referred to as "IPO participation
rights." In general, these rights
may take the form of a firm option (similar to a preemptive right) or a best
efforts undertaking by the issuer to make available to the venture [capital]
investor shares offered in a future initial public offering. This arrangement
usually is evidenced in a written agreement signed at the time of the venture
[capitalist's] investment. Often these shares are delivered to the venture
[capitalist] investor through a directed share program established at the time
of the initial public offering.
Id.
At first blush, IPO participation rights may also seem to resemble spinning. Much like
directed-share programs, however, it is the issuers, not the underwriters, who usually grant
IPO participation rights. These types of transactions trigger obligations under the federal
securities laws in that the SEC "staff... regards any agreement under which these [IPO
participation] rights are granted by an issuer within one year of the issuer's IPO ... as an
'offer' of a security within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Securities Act." Id. This means
that the issuer must find an exemption for the earlier grant of the IPO participation rights
or run the risk that it will have violated the registration obligation of section 5 of the
Securities Act. Id.; see also Kevin P. Kennedy, Section 5 Issues Relating to IPO Participation
Rights, 32 ANNUAL INST. ON SEc. REG. 343 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B1212 2000). The SEC's principal concern with respect to IPO participation rights
has been enforcing the registration and prospectus delivery obligations of the Securities Act,
and therefore, any further discussion of IPO participation rights lies outside the scope of this
Article.
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may be prompted to ask whether the company's investors, or, for
that matter, even the Board members themselves, have a right to
know that their CEO has received spun shares from the broker-
dealer firm that (not coincidentally) is later selected or recom-
mended to serve as the company's lead underwriter for its own
IPO. Analysis of any other such disclosure obligations, however,
will turn on application of state law fiduciary duty principles, not
the requirements of the federal securities laws. These state-level
disclosure obligations are the topic of the next section.
B. Disclosure Obligations at the State Level
Quite apart from the corporation's prospectus disclosure
obligations under federal securities law, there is the separate
question of whether principles of state corporate law impose any
disclosure obligations-on the company or its managers-as to the
spinning activities engaged in by the company's managers. Analysis
of this disclosure issue presumably would depend on the scope of the
manager's fiduciary duty, including both the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty. With respect to the duty of loyalty inquiry, spinning
practices clearly implicate the corporate opportunity doctrine, which
will be discussed in the next section.91
90. Current SEC disclosure policy regarding management integrity raises a separate line
of inquiry as to whether disclosure of spinning activity might be required under a
"materiality" analysis. Though disclosure is not specifically required by the terms of
Regulation S-K, an investor could argue that disclosure is nonetheless required so that the
statements made in the company's prospectus are not rendered misleading. Do modern
qualitative theories of materiality support this line of reasoning? To the extent that the SEC's
modem theories of materiality require disclosures that bear on management integrity, there
is some support for this view. Bevis Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regarding
Management Integrity, 38 BUS. LAW. 1413 (1983); In the Matter of Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C.
163 (1964). This inquiry into materiality is generally used to compel disclosure of information
that is omitted from the line-item disclosures that are otherwise required to be made part of
the company's prospectus. If no line-item disclosure is required as to the practice of spinning,
it may be more difficult to conclude that the company's failure to disclose spinning activity
resulted in the omission of a material fact, and thereby a misleading disclosure. This line of
reasoning instead seems to run dangerously close to the argument that failed in Santa Fe
Industries, wherein the Supreme Court cautioned against using federal securities laws to
convert what amounts to a breach of fiduciary duty claim under state law into a disclosure
violation under the federal securities laws. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977).
91. See infra notes 105-88 and accompanying text (discussing corporate opportunity
doctrine).
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Under a duty of care analysis, there arises the interesting
question of whether the Board of Directors, or the company's senior
executive officers for that matter, are subject to any obligation to
disclose the nature of prior dealings between the company's
CEO/manager and a prospective underwriter.92 Specifically, do
modern corporate fiduciary duty principles require disclosure by
either the company's CEO, or its Board of Directors, as part of the
duty of care owed to the corporation and its shareholders? This
Article will first consider this disclosure obligation as of the time at
which the Board of Directors of GT Interactive begins the process of
selecting the firm that will serve as the lead underwriter for the GT
Interactive IPO. To analyze the disclosure issues that might arise
at this time, some general observations about the nature of the
Board of Directors' decision-making process for an IPO are in order.
Once the company makes the decision to sell its stock in a public
offering, the general practice today is for companies to interview
usually at least three investment banking firms for the position of
lead underwriter.93 As part of this interview process, the Board will
take into account the recommendation of the company's CEO.94 The
nature of this process poses the question of whether a Mr. Cayre, as
CEO and presumably a member of the company's Board of
Directors, owes any duty to disclose to fellow board members the
existence of a prior relationship with Robertson Stephens, one of the
candidates being considered for the position of lead underwriter for
the company's IPO. It would seem that the existence of such a
relationship should, at a minimum, affect the credibility and weight
to be given by the Board to the CEO's recommendation. But
precisely which rule or legal doctrine serves as the source of a duty
to compel the CEO to disclose this information to the Board-before
the Board makes its decision as to the selection of the lead
92. Although this Article separates analysis of spinning into distinct lines ofinquiryunder
the duty of care and then under the duty of loyalty, this distinction is somewhat artificial in
the context of real-world decision making, where the obligations imposed by a manager's duty
of loyalty often shade into his duty of care.
93. See generally 3 B BLoOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 19, § 8.1 (describing the role of
the underwriter).
94. For a detailed description of the IPO process see generally Cox r. AL., supra note 19,
at 211-314; SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 11, at 29-32; MARC STEINBERG,
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW (3d ed. 2001).
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underwriter?95 This Article posits that, at the very minimum, the
CEO's fiduciary duty obligates him or her to disclose any prior
spinning activity to the Board before it finalizes its selection of the
lead underwriter for the company's IPO. 6
The law and economics scholars of corporate law would most
likely respond to what they probably view as my rather quaint view
of fiduciary duty by saying that we should rely on the reputation
market for managers and directors, as well as other market forces,
to compel this type of disclosure, rather than extending fiduciary
duty law to mandate disclosure of spinning activity.97 The entire
reason for telling the story of spinning is because the lessons
learned from this story lead inexorably to exactly the opposite
conclusion. Indeed, the story of spinning only serves to underscore
the continuing need for fiduciary duty law to fill this residual role
by providing the basis for imposing on managers a duty to disclose
information that bears directly on the credibility of their decisions.
It is at this point in the analysis of fiduciary duty obligations,
moreover, that the response of the investment community takes on
enormous significance in delineating the proper scope of the
fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors. Press accounts
95. It would seem to go without saying that no Board member wants to be embarrassed
by disclosure of the CEO's prior spinning activity with the investment banker who is
ultimately chosen by the Board to serve as the company's lead underwriter after the Board
has decided to hire this particular investment banking firm.
96. This disclosure obligation is reinforced by the recent decision of the Delaware
Supreme Court in Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998); see also Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law's Relevance to
Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505 (2000). The essential importance of the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision inMalone is that it reaffirms the fiduciary duty of candor that some
thought was eroding. Malone's holding is not directly relevant to the practice of spinning
because in the case of spinning activity the shareholders are not being asked to take any
action. The importance of Malone lies in the court's rationale for its holding, which
underscores the traditional view of fiduciary duty law. Malone, 722 A.2d at 9-12. Just as
importantly, the need for managers to make disclosure of their prior spinning activity-as
part of their fiduciary obligation-is more than amply supported by the outraged reaction of
the investingpublic to press accounts describing underwriters' practices for allocatinghot IPO
shares in the unprecedented equity market of the late 1990s. See supra notes 30, 33, 57, 59,
75-77 and accompanying text (describing this investor outrage and the reform measures that
were voluntarily undertaken by Wall Street firms in response).
97. Under this perspective, corporations and their managers would presumably have
complete freedom of contract to define the entire scope of management's responsibilities to the
company. For a general overview as to the scope contractual freedom in this context, see
generally Symposium, ContractualFreedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLum. L. REv. 1395 (1989).
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of investors' responses clearly indicate that investors have
expectations that are quite contrary to the views espoused by many
law and economics scholars. Investors' palpable disappointment in
those corporate managers who have engaged in spinning activity
suggests that they expected that those managers would behave very
differently. By rigorously enforcing principles of fiduciary duty, the
courts are reinforcing the legitimate expectations of investors (and
others) who deal with corporate managers as to acceptable
standards of business ethics.
This Article does not suggest that we should not rely on market
forces, including the reputation market, to curb unethical practices.
Market forces do exert a disciplining influence on the conduct of
managers.98 The reputation market and other market forces,
however, are not enough in and of themselves. The story of spinning
shows that a CEO will often be faced with a contingency, such as the
opportunity to receive an allocation of hot IPO shares, that is not
directly dealt with by the terms of his agreement with the company.
Under these circumstances, a manager who knows that the courts
will rigorously enforce the default rule of fiduciary duty law is more
likely to deal with this unforeseen contingency in a fair and ethical
way. Thus, in the case of spinning, rigorous enforcement of the
CEO's fiduciary duty should obligate him to come forward and
disclose this relationship (i.e., his prior receipt of spun shares) to the
Board before the Board makes the decision to retain the lead
underwriter.99 Moreover, relying on the reputation market to deal
with these potential conflict-of-interest situations abdicates any
further responsibility of the rule of law to monitor the conduct of
business managers and to determine, at least at the margins, what
constitutes fair, or ethical, business practices. This Article posits
that the courts should not relinquish their traditional role of
98. Indeed, my own rather cynical view is that the reform measures voluntarily
undertaken by Wall Street's investment banking firms clearly reflect these forces at work. See
Siconolfi, supra note 3, at A14 ("Recently, however, Wall Street has seen a bit of a backlash.
The National Venture Capital Association, a trade group, has cautioned [its] members that
taking such IPOs could lead to regulation of the venture-capital community.").
99. If this rule of law is rigorously enforced, the lawyer advising the CEO, the Board, or
both, will stand on firm ground in advising that the CEO'is obligated to make this type of
disclosure. See infra notes 174-80,201-02 and accompanying text; see also Kostant, supra note
67.
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enforcing fiduciary duty law to regulate ethical standards of conduct
for corporate managers."
As yet another alternative, some have suggested that the SEC
should amend Regulation S-K to require disclosure of a CEO's prior
spinning activity. This approach would clarify certain issues, though
it also suffers from several fundamental drawbacks. On a going-
forward basis, this kind of line-item disclosure of prior spinning
activity by a company's directors and/or senior executive officers
would resolve the immediate question that this Article raises-
whether this information is material; that is to say, whether
investors would find this information important in evaluating the
totality of the company's required disclosure as to the terms of its
IPO and the plan of distribution to be carried out by the company's
lead underwriter. Mandating disclosure of this information also has
the great virtue (no pun intended) of eliminating any need for either
lawyers or their clients to consider whether the CEO's fiduciary
duty obligates him to make such disclosure. Finally, line-item
disclosure eliminates the other issue that the Article struggles with
in this section-whether the company, or its directors or senior
executive officers, are subject to a fiduciary duty to disclose'their
prior spinning activity.1"'
The fundamental drawback of this suggestion is that this type of
line-item disclosure operates only to solve the immediate problem,
that is, whether disclosure is required of the practice of spinning. It
does not cover future situations of conduct that are not presently
100. If managers and others know that the courts will rigorously enforce fiduciary duty
standards then it creates incentives for the parties to disclose unforeseen contingencies and
to bargain for an appropriate allocation of rights and responsibilities in light of these
unforeseen developments. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text (discussing
contractual limitations on the scope of corporate opportunity doctrine). For all these reasons,
the story of spinning provides compelling support for the courts to continue rigorously
enforcing fiduciary duty as the default rule. See also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247,261-65 (1999).
101. If the SEC were to mandate disclosure by amending Regulation S-K, this approach
would have the commendable virtue of resolving any uncertainty in the future as to whether
disclosure of managers' spinning activity is required, and, if so, what kind of disclosure is
sufficient. This kind of predictability is generally desirable, but promulgating rules requiring
disclosure of spinning activities does not help to clarify the threshold issues of materiality and
duty on which this Article focuses attention. This Article seeks to clarify the scope of a
manager's fiduciary duty and the responsibilities of those corporate lawyers advising their
business clients as to appropriate disclosure and other related matters in this setting.
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addressed by the terms of Regulation S-K. It is in the face of this
type of uncertainty-this type of unanticipated contingency-where
the rule of law may continue to play an important role. If the courts
continue to impose rigorous standards of fiduciary duty as the
default rule that is to guide the conduct of corporate managers, then
the next unanticipated situation that gives rise to a potential
conflict of interest will be governed by the fiduciary duty principles
advocated in this Article. In this way, the rule of law, in the form of
the law of fiduciary duty, will continue to shape the standards of
ethical behavior that can be reasonably expected of corporate
managers operating in the modem business setting.
10 2
As a final matter to consider regarding disclosure, there is the
question of whether the CEO has any disclosure obligation at the
time the underwriter originally spins shares out to the CEO's
personal trading account. In other words, at the time that Mr. Cayre
received the allocation of shares as part of the distribution of Pixar's
hot IPO, did Mr. Cayre incur any duty to disclose his receipt of these
shares? The most obvious source of a disclosure obligation at this
time is the manager's fiduciary duties under state law, most
importantly the corporate manager's duty of loyalty. °3 Here, the
analysis of the scope of the manager's disclosure obligations will
turn on whether the manager's receipt of these hot IPO shares
constitutes the usurpation of a business opportunity in potential
breach of the CEO's fiduciary duty to his or her corporation. This
issue is the focus of the next section.'
102. This kind of line-item disclosure responds directly to those critics, particularly critics
of the corporate opportunity doctrine, who complain that the uncertain scope of fiduciary duty
of modem corporate managers makes it hazardous to predict in specific situations whether
a particular opportunity is a corporate opportunity. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
103. See infra Part III.
104. If, following such disclosure, the Board were to decide (on the merits) to stand by its
original business decision to retain the services of that same investment banker as its lead
underwriter, it would seem likely that many Board members nonetheless would feel that their
trust in the CEO had been betrayed by his failure to disclose the spinning activity before the
Board made its decision as to the lead underwriter for the company's IPO. Although the story
of spinning does seem to have significant implications on the role of trust in the context of
fiduciary relationships, nonetheless any discussion of these implications lies outside the scope
of this Article; they are, in effect, a story for another day. See generally Therese H. Maynard,
Law Matters, Lawyers Matter, 76 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2002).
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HIL SPINNING AS A BREACH OF THE CORPORATE MANAGER'S
FIDUCIARY DUTY: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY AND THE CORPORATE
OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE
When the underwriter spins out shares to the CEO, the fiduciary
duty issue that the individual CEO must resolve is whether this
investment opportunity constitutes a business opportunity that
properly belongs to the corporation. This section examines whether
the CEO's decision to accept the hot TPO shares constitutes a breach
of fiduciary duty on the grounds that the purchase of these shares
is a usurpation of a corporate opportunity. The section begins with
a brief overview of the existing common law framework for
determining the scope of modern corporate opportunity doctrine,
focusing primarily on the law of Delaware.0 5 The remainder of this
section is devoted to applying modern principles of the common law
doctrine of corporate opportunity to the typical situation of spinning
activity, as reflected in the Wall Street Journal account of Mr.
Cayre's decision to keep the shares allocated to him in Pixar's hot
IPO by Robertson Stephens."0 6
105. The primary focus is on Delaware law, as it is widely recognized today-by legal
scholars, practicing lawyers, and corporate managers-to be the leading jurisdiction for
corporate law. See, ag., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1061 (2000); Mark J. Lowenstein,
Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
497, 501-07 (2000); Andrew G.T. Moore, H & Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel
Response, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 779,785-86 (1987); Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate
Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 848-50 (1993). While
[el fforts to explain the success of Delaware [corporate law] have become virtually a cottage
industry for corporate theorists," ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 226 (7th ed. 2001), there can be no doubt about the attractiveness of Delaware
as the state of first choice for incorporation of both new and established businesses. "As of
early 2001, almost 50% of New York Stock Exchange [companies] and 50% of the Fortune 500
companies are incorporated in Delaware. The number of new incorporations in Delaware are
in the range of 45,000 per year." Id.; see also Steven Lipin, Firms Incorporated in Delaware
Are Valued More by Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C21 ("Most companies doing
initial public stock offerings [IPOs] choose to be based in Delaware."). Moreover, "a significant
number of corporate opportunity cases arise in Delaware." HAMILTON, supra, at 900.
106. Siconolfi, supra note 3, at Al.
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A. General Background Regarding the Common Law Doctrine of
Corporate Opportunity
The common law doctrine'0 7 of corporate opportunity rests on the
fundamental principle that a corporation's fiduciaries-its officers
and directors-are not allowed to personally take advantage of a
business opportunity that rightfully belongs to the corporation.' 8
Over the years, the inherent difficulty in applying this doctrine has
arisen primarily in deciding whether a particular business oppor-
tunity is a corporate opportunity. This threshold determination is
crucial because if a particular business opportunity is not found to
be a corporate opportunity, then the individual officer or director
may take advantage of the opportunity for personal profit.0 9 But
107. Traditionally, this issue has not been addressed by statute, and so is governed
primarily by case law. That may be changing, however, as reflected in Delaware's recent
amendments to section 122 of its General Corporation Law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122
(2000).
108. "A moment's reflection should reveal that the corporate opportunity doctrine is of
central importance in assuring the integrity of a business." HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 898.
In light of the established purpose of the corporate opportunity doctrine, a disclaimer is in
order here. I am not writing this Article to dispute the wisdom of continuing the common law
tradition of enforcing fiduciary duty standards of fairness through the corporate opportunity
doctrine. Rather, my analysis starts from the premise that the corporate opportunity doctrine
is an established part of the fiduciary duty obligations imposed by operation of law on modem
corporate managers. The discussion in this section, therefore, is intended to provide the
reader with a concise overview of the case law that has established the current framework for
analyzing modem principles of the corporate opportunity doctrine. For a fuller discussion of
the theoretical underpinnings of this doctrine see generally Victor Brudney & Robert Charles
Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1981); Eric Talley,
Turning Servile Opportunites to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities
Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277 (1998); David J. Brown, Note, When Opportunity Knocks: An
Analysis of the Brudney & Clark and AL Principles of Corporate Governance Proposals for
Deciding Corporate Opportunity Claims, 11 J. CORP. L. 255 (1986).
109. "At common law, courts developed a host of factors for determining whether a
[corporate manager's] fiduciary duty requires her to pass up a business opportunity, or
whether, instead, she is free to take it for herself." Michael Begert, The Corporate Opportunity
Doctrine and Outside Business Interests, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 827, 829 (1989) (footnotes
omitted). On the other hand, if it does constitute a corporate opportunity, the modem view
nonetheless allows the director to take advantage of the opportunity if he first proceeds to
remove the corporate opportunity taint. 'Therefore, if the [corporate manager] first offers the
opportunityto the corporationwith full disclosure and the disinterested boardmembers reject
the opportunity, then the director may take [advantage of] it. Such a formal rejection always
constitutes a defense." Id. at 836-37. This point is also made clear in the most recent efforts
to formulate the scope of corporate opportunity doctrine. See infra notes 122-35 and
accompanying text.
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this is very much a high-stakes poker game, if you will, because
if the corporate fiduciary guesses wrong and personally takes
advantage of a business opportunity that is later determined to be
a corporate opportunity, then the traditional remedy calls for the
court to impose a constructive trust.1 0 Under this remedy, all of the
profit gained by the wrongdoing fiduciary must be turned over to the
corporation."'
Over the years, the courts have struggled to craft a workable
definition of what constitutes a "corporate opportunity." The earliest
formulation was the "interest or expectancy test," which generally
confined the corporate opportunity doctrine to "property wherein the
corporation has an interest already existing, or in which it has an
expectancy growing out of an existing right, or to cases where the
[managers'] interference will in some degree balk the corporation in
effecting the purpose of its creation."' In recent years, this narrow,
property-oriented test has evolved into what has come to be known
as the "line of business test." Originally articulated in what remains
the leading case, Guth v. Loft,"3 the Delaware Supreme Court
framed the relevant inquiry as follows:
[Imfthere is presented to a corporate officer or director a business
opportunity which the corporation is financially able to
undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation's
business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in'which the
corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by
embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or
director will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation,
the law will not permit him to seize the opportunity for
himself"14
Under this formulation of the corporate opportunity doctrine, the
focus is on the factual question of "the closeness of fit between the
110. "Where there has been a usurpation of a corporate opportunity, the corporation may
elect to claim the benefits of the transaction. The property that the officer or director has
acquired in violation of his fiduciary duty is held in constructive trust for the corporation."
COXETAL., supra note 19, at 245 (footnote omitted).
111. Id.
112. Largarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 28 So. 199,201 (Ala. 1900).
113. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
114. Id. at 511.
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opportufiity and the corporation's business." 15 Therefore, "[u]nlike
the 'interest or expectancy' test, the Guth test does not require that
the corporation has previously done something to establish its rights
in the opportunity."" 6
But therein lies the inherent difficulty in applying the corporate
opportunity doctrine. Traditionally, this doctrine has required
corporate managers to wrestle with difficult factual questions as to
whether a particular investment opportunity involves a corporate
opportunity because of the "closeness of the fit" between the nature
of the business opportunity and the company's line of business. In
determining the closeness of this fit, the courts since Guth have
generally required that this analysis include not only the company's
existing line of business, but also take into account any closely
related lines of business, as well as any potential plans for
expansion of the company's line of business. The scope of the
factual inquiry under the modern line of business approach is
obviously fraught with great complexity and ultimately yields
great uncertainty as to the proper scope of a company's "line of
business."" 7 Not surprisingly, the corporate opportunity doctrine
has been the frequent subject of criticism, both in the academic
literature as well as among members of the practicing bar. Most
often, these critics complain of the "vagueness" of the standard to be
used in defining what constitutes a corporate opportunity' and the
uncertainty resulting from this inherent "vagueness." "
115. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Corporate Opportunity and Comparative Advantage, 84 IOWA
L. REV. 211, 212 (1998).
116. Id.
117. On the other hand, who but the company's managers are in a better position to know
what is closely related to the company's line of business or to know of what the company's
future plans for expansion consist? Seen in this light, at least some of the criticism as to the
uncertainty inherent in applying the line of business testis ameliorated. Along this same line
of reasoning-and relying on the traditional line of business approach to decide if a particular
business opportunity "properly belonged" to the corporation-at least one court has recently
asserted that lt]he law is clear that 'one entrusted with the active management of a
corporation, such as an officer or director, occupies a fiduciary relationship to the corporation
and may not exploit his position as an insider' by appropriating to himself a business
opportunity properly belonging to the corporation." In re Villa Maria, Inc., 312 N.W.2d 921,
922 (Minn. 1981) (quoting Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71,78 (Minn. 1974)).
118. E.g., Begert, supra note 109; Pat K. Chew, Competing Interests in the Corporate
Opportunity Doctrine, 67 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, Contract and Trust in
Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Opportunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5 (1996); Harvey Gelb,
The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine-Recent Cases and the Elusive Goal of Clarity, 31 U.
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"In an effort to ... ameliorate the often-expressed criticism that
the [corporate opportunity] doctrine is vague and subjects today's
corporate management to the danger of unpredictable liability," the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in Miller v. Miller developed yet
another approach by combining the "line of business" test with what
amounts to a fundamental "fairness" test."9 The first step in the
Miller approach essentially involves a restatement of the traditional
line of business test, while the second step focuses on "the equitable
considerations existing prior to, at the time of, and following the
officer's acquisition" of this corporate opportunity." Reduced to its
essence, Miller's second prong, the "fairness" inquiry, requires the
court to take into account "ethical standards of what is fair and
equitable under the circumstances" in deciding whether a director
has breached his fiduciary duty by usurping a corporate oppor-
tunity.'2
The most recent development in this ongoing struggle to
delineate those business opportunities that belong to the cor-
poration is the test adopted by the American Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance.2 The ALI approach tracks the
line of business test in that section 5.05 first defines a corporate
opportunity as:
(1) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a
director or senior executive becomes aware, either:
(A) In connection with the performance of functions
as a director or senior executive, or under circum-
RICH. L. REv. 371 (1997); Eric G. Orlinsky, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Interested
Director Transactions: A Framework for Analysis in an Attempt to Restore Predictability, 24
DEL. J. CORP. L. 451 (1999); Edward J. Trawinski, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, N.J. Law.,
May/June 1991, at 28.
119. Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71,81 (Minn. 1974).
120. Id. at 81.
121. Id. at 80. In a recent unpublished Minnesota case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
following the earlier decision in Miller, held that "an officer or director [of a corporation]
occupies a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and may not exploit his position as an
Insider' by appropriating to himself a business opportunity properly belonging to the
corporation." South Side Sales & Leasingv. Maas, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 948, at *3 (2000).
122. ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
5.05 (1992) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES]. Other jurisdictions have adopted the ALI approach
to defining the scope of the corporate opportunity. AMERCO v. Shoen, 907 P.2d 536, 545
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146,1151-52 (Me.
1995).
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stances that should reasonably lead the director or
senior executive to believe that the person offering
the opportunity expects it to be offered to the
corporation; or
(B) Through the use of corporate information or
property, if the resulting opportunity is one that the
director or senior executive should reasonably be
expected to believe would be of interest to the
corporation; or
(2) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of
which a senior executive becomes aware and knows is
closely related to a business in which the corporation is
engaged or expects to engage.12
ALI section 5.05 further prohibits a director or senior executive
officer from taking advantage of a corporate opportunity unless he
first offers it to the corporation and, as part of this offer, makes
certain disclosures to the company's board of directors. 4
Thus, the ALI approach is similar to the two-pronged analysis of
corporate opportunity established in the Miller decision. First, the
threshold determination must be made as to whether the business
opportunity is a corporate opportunity that belongs to the cor-
poration. Then the analysis shifts to focus on the manner in which
the corporate manager goes about taking personal advantage of this
opportunity. In order for the manager to remove the taint of
"corporate opportunity" from the prospective business opportunity,
the corporation must have made the decision to reject pursuing the
business opportunity. 5 To be effective, this rejection must satisfy
one of the following tests set forth in ALI section 5.05(a)(3):
(A) The rejection of the opportunity is fair to the corporation;
(B) The opportunity is rejected in advance, following such
disclosure, by disinterested directors [§ 1.151, or, in the
case of a senior executive who is not a director, by a
123. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 5.05(b) (emphasis added).
124. 'The truly significant contribution of [ALI PRINCIPLES] section 5.05 is that it causes
the director or senior executive officer to first obtain disinterested approval of the board of
directors.' CoxETAL., supra note 19, at 241.
125. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 5.05(a)(3).
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disinterested superior, in a manner that satisfies the
standards of the business judgment rule [§ 4.01(c)]; or
(C) The rejection is authorized in advance or ratified, following
such disclosure, by disinterested shareholders [§ 1.161, and
the rejection is not equivalent to a waste of corporate
assets [§ 1.42.1 s
Thus, the ALI approach allows the insider to take advantage
of a corporate opportunity but only if the fiduciary has "fully
disclose[dI to the corporation, all material facts concerning the
opportunity."" Because this disclosure-oriented approach provides
a clear procedure for the insider to protect herself against liability,
several courts have embraced the ALI formulation of the corporate
opportunity doctrine.'
126. Id. § 5.05(a)(3). "Absent such approval [of the disinterested directors], the only option
is the more cumbersome and expensive process of obtaining shareholder approval or the less-
predictable burden of proving no unfairness to the corporation." Cox ETAL., supra note 19, at
242. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) was recently amended to add
section 8.31. Although it does not specifically address the corporate opportunity doctrine,
section 8.31(a) does provide, in relevant part, that a director is not liable to the corporation
or its shareholders for the decision to take personal advantage of a corporate opportunity
unless the plaintiff can show that "the challenged conduct consisted or was the result of...
receipt of a financial benefit to which the director was not entitled or any other breach of the
director's duties to deal fairly with the corporation and its shareholders that is actionable
under applicable law." Using language reminiscent of the ALI approach, the comment to this
recent amendment to the RMBCA elaborates on the nature of the central concern in the area
of corporate opportunity:.
It has long been recognized that a director must first offer a "corporate
opportunity" to the corporation before taking advantage of it. The term
"corporate opportunity" can be readily stated in principle but, when determining
the doctrine's application, the facts will often be outcome determinative.
The application of the corporate opportunity doctrine, in cases where it is
operative, is typically conditioned on the corporation's financial ability to exploit
the opportunity, although some courts have held it is up to the corporation to
judge that ability and the corporation should therefore always be offered [the
opportunity]. Relatedly, a formal offer is not essential, so long as the
surrounding circumstances indicate an awareness of, and afford the corporation
reasonable access to the opportunity and there is indicated disinterest [in
pursuing the opportunity], manifested [either] by inaction or due to financial
inability. Failure to observe this obligation first to refer a corporate opportunity
to the corporation results in a breach of a director's duty.
Official Comment, RMBCA § 8.31, reprinted in ADAMs & MATHESON, CORPORAnONS AND
OTHER STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS 116 (2000 ed.)
127. Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, 677 N.E.2d 159, 180 (Mass. 1997).
128. E.g., id.; Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 1995).
In adopting the ALI approach, the Harris court held that the ALI disclosure requirement
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The same fundamental concerns at the heart of the ALI approach
are likewise reflected in the most recent Delaware Supreme Court
decision addressing the scope of the corporate opportunity doctrine.
That decision is the focus of the next section.
B. Delaware Courts and the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
In Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc.,'29 the Delaware
Supreme Court further refined its established line of business
approach, as originally formulated in its landmark decision, Guth
v. Loft.3 ° The Broz decision is important to the story of spinning
because of its factual similarity to the conduct of spinning, as well
as the further refinements that the Delaware Supreme Court made
in its approach to the corporate opportunity doctrine.
Robert Broz was president and sole shareholder of RFB Cellular,
Inc. (RFBC).'3' Separately, Mr. Broz served as a member of the
board of directors at Cellular Information Systems, Inc. (CIS).2
Both companies, RFBC and CIS, were Delaware corporations as
well as competitors in the business of providing cellular telephone
service.' 3 RFBC owned and operated a cellular phone license area
in Michigan while CIS owned and operated cellular phone licenses
in other states. 4 A brokerage firm representing Mackinac Cellular
recognizes the vital importance of the duty of loyalty while protecting the ability of the
fiduciary to pursue his/her own business ventures. Harris, 661 A.2d at 1152. As one
commentator has observed, "a sensible outcome exists if a rule allows a corporate official to
proceed justifiably in his or her own self interest without undue delay or inappropriate
amdety about usurping a corporate opportunity." Gelb, supra note 118, at 372-73.
129. 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
130. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
131. Broz, 673 A.2d at 150.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 151-52. See also the discussion, supra note 107, regarding recent legislative
amendments to Delaware's General Corporate Law, which allows Delaware corporations to
amend their charter to define what constitutes a corporate opportunity. I believe that this
legislative amendment was intended to address the kind of situation that we see in Broz,
where an individual serves on the boards of two companies that are within the same industry.
Generally speaking, this is not the usual practice since most corporations do not want
individuals who are related to a competitor to serve on their Board of Directors. However, in
Internet-related industries, this practice was often compromised, owing apparently to the
dearth of knowledgeable and capable individuals who were willing to serve as
directors-especially on the Board of a start-up corporation.
134. Broz, 673 A.2d at 151-52.
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Corporation (Mackinac) contacted Mr. Broz regarding the possible
acquisition of the Michigan-2 cellular license by RFBC. 35 However,
the brokerage firm did not offer the Michigan-2 license directly to
CIS, which at the time was experiencing serious financial
difficulties."6 Mr. Broz did not formally present this opportunity to
the CIS board but rather informed the CEO and two other directors
of his interest in the opportunity. All three individuals informally
told Mr. Broz that they believed CIS itself would not be interested
in the Michigan-2 license because CIS had recently emerged from
bankruptcy reorganization and the company was actively engaged
in the process of divesting itself of its cellular licenses.
Before Mr. Broz acquired the Michigan-2 license, another
corporation, PriCellular, Inc. (PriCellular), became involved in steps
to acquire CIS. PriCellular was also interested in the Michigan-2
license and negotiated with Mackinac to arrange an option to
purchase that license. 7 The CIS Board of Directors was aware that
both PriCellular and Mr. Broz were bidding for the Michigan-2
license, but the CIS Board did not get involved.'38 On behalf of
RFBC, Mr. Broz submitted the highest bid and RFBC was awarded
the Michigan-2 license.' 9 At the time of this bidding process,
PriCellular had no equity interest in CIS. 40 Subsequent to this
bidding process, however, PriCellular bought a controlling interest
in CIS." After acquiring control of CIS, PriCellular discharged the
members of the CIS Board of Directors, and commenced an action
against Mr. Broz for equitable relief, contending that his purchase
of the Michigan-2 license constituted the usurpation of a corporate
opportunity in breach of his fiduciary duty to CIS.' 2
135. ld.
136. Id at 151-54.
137. Id. The bidding process at issue in Broz clearly illustrates the potential for conflicts
of interest when individuals serve on the Boards of companies that operate within the same
industry. Although this is a story that I hope to tell another day, I believe that this is the kind
of situation that prompted the Delaware legislature to enact the recent amendment to its
General Corporate Law, adding new section 122 (17). See supra note 107 (describing this
recent Delaware amendment).
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In its opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he
corporate opportunity doctrine represents a judicially crafted effort
to harmonize the competing demands placed on corporate
fiduciaries in a modern business environment."' In finding that
Mr. Broz had not breached his fiduciary duty to CIS, the court
employed a list of factors to be considered insofar as they are
relevant to the factual situation presented by a particular case.1'
Relying on its earlier decision in Guth v. Loft, 45 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the corporate officer or director may not
seize a business opportunity for his/her own benefit if:
(1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the
opportunity; (2) the opportunity is within the corporation's line
of business; (3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in
the opportunity; and (4) by taking the opportunity for his or her
own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position
inimicable to his or her duties to the corporation.146
Notwithstanding the conclusion that a particular business
opportunity is a "corporate opportunity," the Delaware Supreme
Court, recognizing the exigencies of modern business reality, went
on to assert that
a director or officer may take a corporate opportunity if: (1) the
opportunity is presented to the director or officer in his
individual and not his corporate capacity; (2) the opportunity is
not essential to the corporation; (3) the corporation holds no
interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) the director or
officer has not wrongfully employed the resources of the
corporation in pursuing or exploiting the opportunity.'47
In the course of its reasoning, the Broz court also made it clear that
these factors are to "provide guidelines to be considered by a
reviewing court in balancing the equities of an individual case....
[N]o one factor is dispositive and all factors must be taken into
143. Id. at 159.
144. Id. at 151.
145. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
146. Broz, 673 A.2d at 155.
147. Id. (citing Guth, 5 A.2d at 509).
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account insofar as they are applicable."14 Moreover, whether or not
a corporate opportunity is usurped is a factual question to be
determined by 'reasonable inference from objective facts.'"'49
The Delaware Supreme Court then applied this formulation of the
corporate opportunity doctrine to the situation in which Mr. Broz
found himself." After a lengthy review of the factual circumstances
surrounding Mr. Broz's decision to acquire the Michigan-2 license
for RFBC, his wholly owned corporation,'' the Delaware Supreme
Court concluded that Mr. Broz's acquisition of the cellular license
did not constitute the usurpation of a corporate opportunity,
notwithstanding the close fit between the Michigan-2 license Mr.
Broz acquired and the existing line of business of his corporation,
CIS.15 2
In finding that Mr. Broz did not usurp a corporate opportunity,
the Delaware Supreme Court first considered the manner in which
the director learned of the opportunity. 3 The court emphasized the
fact that Mr. Broz learned of the opportunity through his individual
capacity rather than in his corporate capacity.'5 Mr. Broz learned
of the Michigan-2 license opportunity through his company RFBC,
rather than as a result of his position at CIS. Indeed, the broker
who approached Mr. Broz to offer him the Michigan-2 license never
offered the opportunity to CIS, presumably because this broker was
aware that CIS was financially distressed.' 55
148. 1d.
149. Id. at 155 (quoting Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Del. 1956)).
150. I& at 155-57.
151. Id. at 151-53.
152. Id. at 157.
153. Id at 155.
154. Id.
155. Although relevant, I am not generally in favor of leaving the definition of corporate
opportunity to be defined entirely by the conduct or expectations of third parties who are not
related to the corporation, such as this broker who offered the Michigan-2 license to Mr. Broz.
In this case, however, the broker's decision to offer the Michigan-2 license to Mr. Broz
individually seems particularly relevant in that it bears directly on the financially distressed
circumstances of CIS. It is worth pointing out that, however, as the leading treatise on
California corporate law asserts, a corporate opportunity arises
in some circumstances [where the facts show that] a business opportunity [has
been] presented to the director [or officer], even when the corporation has had
no previous dealings or connections whatever with the other party who presents
the business opportunity.
HARoLDmMETAL., CALIrORNIA CORPOATION LAW § 11.12 (4th ed. Supp. 2001) (emphasis
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The court then applied its four-pronged approach for determining
liability for usurping a corporate opportunity.'5 6 The first factor was
not satisfied because the court found that CIS did not have the
financial ability to exploit the Michigan-2 license.'57 CIS had
recently emerged from a lengthy bankruptcy proceeding and was
not in a position to commit its capital to the acquisition of new
assets.'58 In the course of its discussion, the court emphasized that
Mr. Broz was required to consider the facts "only as they existed at
the time he determined to accept the Mackinac offer." 59 This
emphasis was presumably made by the court to take into account
the subsequent acquisition of CIS by Pri-Cellular, a fact that Mr.
Broz seemingly did not have to anticipate in deciding whether to bid
for the Michigan-2 license.
On the second prong, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the
Michigan-2 opportunity was in the same "line of business" in which
CIS was engaged. 6 Specifically, the court ruled that the Michigan-2
opportunity was a cellular service license and both companies were
in the business of acquiring cellular service areas.' 61 Unlike the
approach in Guth, however, this factor was not, by itself, sufficient
to establish that Mr. Broz usurped a corporate opportunity.162
On the third prong, the Broz court found that CIS had no
"interest or expectancy" in the Michigan-2 opportunity. 63 For a
added). In this context, where the third party has had no prior contact with the corporation,
Professor Pat Chew's criticism of traditional judicial approach to corporate opportunity
doctrine resonates; she worries that under Guth, virtually all opportunities, at least
presumptively, belong to the corporation, which Professor Chew claims may produce results
that impair societal and individual interests. See Chew, supra note 118, at 458-59 (1989).
156. Broz, 673 A.2d at 155-57.
157. Id. at 155-56.
158. Id. at 155.
159. Id. at 156.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 156-57. This case is typical of the kind of difficult fact determinations that make
lawyers and their clients so critical of the corporate opportunity doctrine. See supra note 108
(listing law review articles dealing with corporate opportunity doctrine). On the other hand,
the Broz court made it very easy for lawyers and their clients to avoid these often difficult
issues of fact. In a close case, the corporate officer or director need only make full and
adequate disclosure of the opportunity in order to avoid any personal liability for taking
advantage of business opportunities he learned of through his position as a corporate
fiduciary. See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure as a complete
defense to liability under ALI approach).
163. Broz, 673 A.2d at 156-57.
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corporation to have an *actual or expectant interest in any specific
property, "there must be some tie between that property and the
nature of the corporate business."' At the time the opportunity was
presented, CIS was actively divesting its license holdings and had
no intention to acquire additional licenses.165 Thus the court held
that there was no relationship between the Michigan-2 opportunity
and the nature of CIS's future business plans.166
Lastly, the fourth prong was not satisfied because the court found
that "Broz' interest in acquiring and profiting from Michigan-2
created no duties that were inimical to his obligations to CIS."6 '
Instead, Mr. Broz "took care not to usurp any opportunity which
CIS was willing and able to pursue."168 Mr. Broz sought only to
compete with an unrelated outside entity, PriCellular, for
acquisition of this business opportunity. 69 At that time, his
fiduciary obligation to CIS did not obligate Mr. Broz to refrain from
competing with PriCellular.'70 In light of the totality of these
circumstances, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that Mr.
Broz did not unlawfully usurp an opportunity properly belonging to
CIS. 17
1
Before shifting focus to an application of corporate opportunity
doctrine to the practice of spinning, it is important to note that
nothing in the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Broz is
inconsistent with the notion that modern fiduciary duty law should
operate to hold managers accountable to their corporation. In this
regard, it is quite significant, as a factual matter, that Mr. Broz took
advantage of the opportunity to acquire the Michigan-2 cellular
license only after making his corporation, CIS, aware of the
opportunity, albeit informally."2 In addition to its analysis of
whether the acquisition of the Michigan-2 license constituted a
164. Id. at 156.
165. Id. at 156-57.
166. Id. at 157. By actively divestingits license holdings, CIS seeminglydemonstrated that
it had no interest in the Michigan-2 opportunity, or at least this seems to be a fair inference
to draw from this conduct. Id. at 156-57.





172. Id. at 152.
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corporate opportunity, the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated its
view that a director may seize a corporate opportunity without
breaching his fiduciary duty to the corporation, depending on the
manner in which the director goes about making the decision to take
advantage of a corporate opportunity.
173
Along these same lines, it is equally important to consider the
Delaware Supreme Court's discussion of the need for the insider
(officer or director) to make a formal presentation to the company's
Board of Directors in order to insulate himself from personal
liability.7 4 The Broz court rejects any suggestion that its earlier
decision in Guth required Mr. Broz to make a formal presentation
of the Michigan-2 license to CIS. 75 Instead, the Broz court opted
for a more loosely formulated requirement of good faith on the
part of the director who decides to take advantage of a corporate
opportunity. 76 The fact that Mr. Broz did not take the opportunity
surreptitiously was crucial, therefore, to demonstrating his good
faith.177 Indeed, Mr. Broz acted in good faith in that he informed the
CEO and two other directors of his interest in the opportunity and
all three individuals informally communicated to Mr. Broz that they
believed CIS itself would not be interested in the transaction.78 The
Broz court held that the failure of a director to make a formal
presentation of a corporate opportunity to the corporation does not
necessarily result in improper usurpation. 17 9 Although the holding
in Broz recognized that adequate disclosure was a complete defense
to a claim of usurpation of a corporate opportunity, the Delaware
court declined to recognize that nondisclosure, in and of itself,
established that a corporate manager had usurped a corporate
opportunity in breach of his fiduciary duty. 80
As this Article describes in more detail in the next section, the
factual circumstances presented in Broz as well as the reasoning
used by the Broz court are both quite helpful in understanding the
corporate opportunity implications inherent in the story of spinning.
173. Id. at 154-55.
174. Id at 150, 157-58.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 158.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 152.
179. Id. at 150, 157-58.
180. Id.; see also In re Digex, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171 (2000).
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C. Applying the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine to the Practice of
Spinning
This section applies established principles of the common law
doctrine of corporate opportunity, as expanded by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Broz, to the situation of "spinning." Specifically,
this section will examine whether Mr. Cayre usurped an investment
opportunity that belonged to his corporation, GT Interactive, when
he accepted shares of the Pixar hot IPO allocated to him by Pixar's
lead underwriter, Robertson Stephens.
The Delaware Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that the
starting point for the analysis of whether the spinning of Pixar
shares to Mr. Cayre's personal account constitutes the usurpation
of a corporate opportunity is consideration of the manner in which
a particular business opportunity came to the attention of the
corporate manager. Thus, the analysis initially focuses on the
manner in which the allocation of Pixar's hot IPO shares were
deposited in Mr. Cayre's personal discretionary trading account.
This allocation of shares in Pixar's hot [PO seemingly was made to
Mr. Cayre because he served as the CEO of a company that was
widely known among the investment banking community to be itself
an IPO candidate."8 ' Because the opportunity came to Mr. Cayre as
181. Indeed, Mr. Cayre's situation maybe even more egregious because the press accounts
of his purchase reflect that he demanded that Robertson Stephens provide him with an even
larger allocation of Pixar's offering than it originally planned as an apparent quid pro quo for
Mr. Cayre's continued support for the selection of Robertson Stephens as the lead underwriter
for GT Interactive's IPO. Siconolfi, supra note 3, at Al ("[When an internal debate arose
within the investment bank [Robertson Stephens] about making such a big Pixar allocation
[to Mr. Cayre], Mr. Robertson [chairman of Robertson Stephens] recalls that Mr. Cayre
threatened to take his business elsewhere if he didn't get all 100,000 Pixar shares."). This
conduct only serves to underscore that the opportunity to invest in Pixar's offering came as
the direct result of Mr. Cayre's position with the corporation, GT Interactive. This seems to
be reason enough to find that Mr. Cayre has taken advantage of a corporate opportunity in
breach of his fiduciary duty to his corporation. The appearance of impropriety seems clear
enough in merely receiving hot IPO allocations; using the position of corporate CEO to exert
influence over the underwriter's allocation decision seems to be particularly egregious conduct
for which the corporate manager should be held personally accountable. And Mr. Cayre's
conduct is merely a well-documented and widely publicized example, not an isolated
occurrence.
[S]ome investment bankers contended that corporate executives frequently
pressure them for the allocations. Says Jack Dunphy, syndicate chief for Cowen
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:2023
a result of his position within the company, this is powerful
evidence that this investment opportunity constituted a corporate
opportunity. 18 2 Even more compelling evidence of a corporate
opportunity taint to this allocation of Pixar shares is the
underwriter's apparent assumption that Mr. Cayre would direct his
company's future underwriting business to Robertson Stephens.'m
The Delaware Supreme Court also directed that the other three
factors were to "be taken into account insofar as they are appli-
cable."' As to the second factor, Mr. Cayre's investment in an
allocation of hot IPO shares is probably "not essential to the
corporation," although the corporation probably does hold an
interest or expectancy in the investment opportunity within the
meaning of the third prong of the Broz analysis. Because the
opportunity came to Mr. Cayre only because of his position within
& Co., a New York firm that allocates a relatively small number of IPO shares
to corporate executives: "There are a lot of these guys who put the arm on you
for the stock."
Siconolfi, SEC, NASD, supra note 26, at A3.
182. This conclusion is supported by the only passing reference--as to the nature of the
responsibilities of those corporate managers who receive hot IPO allocations-that I could find
among the scores of press accounts critically examining the practice of spinning published
since November 1997 (when Mr. Cayre's story was first publicized in the Wall Street Journal):
The duty of corporate executives in the practice of spinning, regulators and
corporate lawyers say, is spelled out in state law under the legal doctrine known
as "corporate opportunity." The gist of the law: Corporate executives can't take
personal advantage of financial opportunities that come to them by virtue of
their position at the company. Instead, the executives are required to offer the
opportunities to their company.
"If the opportunity is presented to the officer or director in his corporate
capacity or because he is known to the other party as an officer or director of the
corporation, it is much easier for the court to determine that he should have
given it to the corporation," according to Marsh's California Corporation Law,
a legal authority on that state's corporate law.
Siconolfi, SEC Broadens, supra note 26, at C20. The same Wall Street Journal article goes on
to observe that the regulatory scrutiny to date has concentrated on Wall Street underwriting
firms and their IPO allocation practices. Despite numerous press accounts of ongoing
regulatory investigations (civil and criminal), this is the only reference that I could unearth
scrutinizing the "receiving end"-the legal issues surrounding the CEO's decision to accept
the "spun shares." Id. It is curious that the only published article in the financial press that
directly raises the issue of the CEO's culpability refers to the comments of unidentified
members of the corporate bar who seem to assume that the practice of spinning creates
fiduciary duty problems for the CEO under the corporate opportunity doctrine.
183. See supra note 60 (referring to Wall Street Journal articles providing support for this
assumption of a quid pro quo on the part of the underwriter).
184. Broz, 673 A.2d at 155.
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the corporation and in apparent anticipation that he would direct
the corporation's investment banking business to Robertson
Stephens, it would seem the corporation's interest predominates
the individual interests of the corporation's CEO, Mr. Cayre.
Accordingly, if this allocation was made in order to obtain the
company's future business, it would seem that this investment
opportunity should be shared with all shareholders of GT
Interactive. On the final prong of the Broz criteria, it would seem
that Mr. Cayre has not directly employed the resources of his
corporation since he appears to have purchased the Pixar shares
using his own funds, so that this prong is not directly implicated on
these facts.
At this point in analyzing the four-pronged criteria of the Broz
decision, it is important to remember that the Broz court held that
the determination of corporate opportunity is a factual question to
be determined by "balancing the equities of an individual case." The
circumstances outlined in the November 1997 Wall Street Journal
article clearly seem to give rise to a corporate opportunity problem.
The underwriter, Robertson Stephens, was spinning out these
shares to the CEO, Mr. Cayre, as an apparent quid pro quo for
future business from this CEO's employer, GT Interactive.1 85 As
such, this allocation was not made because of the personal business
that the underwriter anticipated receiving directly from the CEO as
an individual investor."8 6 Instead, this spinning activity seems to
have been directly related to the individual's position as CEO
within the corporation. On these facts, I have no doubt that the
common law, including Delaware, would find that this investment
opportunity constituted a corporate opportunity. Alternatively, if
in fact this CEO has an ongoing relationship with this particular
investment banking firm-that includes the specific investment
strategy of getting as many hot IPO allocations as he can-then the
default rule should require this CEO to make disclosure of his
earlier transactions with the company's prospective underwriter and
185. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
186. Indeed, on these facts, the underwriter's spinning activity creates, at the very least,
the appearance of a quid pro quo for future business-something in the nature of a bribe. See
supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing the NASD rule on illegal payment of a
"gratuity"); note 30 and accompanying text (describing spinning as being in the nature of a
"bribe").
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explain why receiving hot IPO allocations does not involve the
usurpation of a corporate opportunity. Consistent with the rea-
soning in Broz, this type of disclosure removes the corporate
opportunity taint from the CEO's decision to purchase these hot IPO
shares because the CEO can establish that his prior personal
relationship with this investment banking firm was the driving
force behind the underwriter's decision to spin shares out to the
CEO.187
Finally, and perhaps most significantly for the story of spinning,
is the reaction of Wall Street participants-both investors and
investment bankers-to Mr. Cayre's conduct. Their reaction clearly
supports the conclusion that Mr. Cayre usurped a corporate
opportunity that belonged to his corporation, GT Interactive.
Numerous press accounts appeared in the wake of the November
1997 Wall Street Journal article which originally described Mr.
Cayre's spinning activity. These articles quote various investors and
their financial advisors as condemning the practice of spinning,
many likening it to a "bribe," or at the very least, a smarmy
business practice.'88 This reaction clearly reflects the strong
sentiment that Mr. Cayre received this allocation of Pixar shares
only because of his position within the corporation, GT Interactive.
187. Under this line of reasoning, the spinning activity would not be attributable to the
CEO's position within the corporation. This approach is also consistent with the NASD Free-
Riding Rule, which allows allocations of hot IFO shares to certain categories of "restricted
persons" if the underwriter can show that such an allocation is not disproportionate and is
consistent with the person's established investment practice. See supra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text. In the rather unlikely case where the CEO can satisfactorily establish
that shares that were spun out to his personal account do not involve a corporate opportunity,
this relationship nonetheless should be brought to the attention of the board as part of its
decision-making process because it bears directly on the independence of the CEO and
therefore bears on the credibility of the CEO's recommendation as to the selection of the lead
underwriter for the company's IPO. Indeed, at a minimum, the fiduciary duty of the corporate
manager should obligate him to come forward and volunteer disclosure of this relationship,
which arises as a result of his prior spinning activity with a prospective underwriter for the
company. To the extent that the law and economics school of thought may try to argue that
this was implied compensation, the appalled reaction of so many observers clearly reflects
that there is no basis for this assumption; in other words, investor reaction clearly shows that
this is not an implied term of the manager's compensation, contrary to the contractarian view.
188. E.g., Lashinsky, supra note 30, at 1E ("[Slome say the investment bankers are
bribing the CEOs to win future investment banking fees."); Siconolfi, supra note 3, at Al
("Spin shares don't go to the corporate customer itself-they go to individuals at the
corporation who are in a position to sway the company's decisions. 'It's a bribe, no question
about it,' contends Robert Messih, a managing director at Salomon Inc ..... ).
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That reaction, coupled with Mr. Cayre's failure to disclose this
investment opportunity to his corporation before seizing it for
himself, clearly reinforces the conclusion that, based on the story
told in the Wall Street Journal, he has left himself open to a claim
of breaching his fiduciary duty by usurping a corporate opportunity.
As a final observation regarding investor reaction to Mr. Cayre's
conduct, even a casual perusal of this fallout reflects a fundamental
concern within the business community as to the fairness of this
spinning activity, and calls into question the ethics of both the
investment banker who spins the hot IPO shares, and the CEO who
personally profits from flipping these shares. Part IV addresses
these ethical concerns.
IV. THE STORY OF SPINNIG-A MATTER OF BUSINESS ETHics?
A The Importance of Fiduciary Duty Law in Regulating the
Business Ethics of Corporate Managers
In considering these reports of investor reactions to press
accounts of Mr. Cayre's conduct and his story of spinning, is it
possible to see a more profound problem reflected in their disap-
pointed expectations?. 9 Does their disappointment somehow reflect
investors' legitimate and reasonable expectations about how their
CEO would behave in the face of an unanticipated event-such as
the opportunity to receive an allocation of shares in a "hot IPO"? As
such, is this different from the situation where the investment
banker pays the greens fees to go golfing with the CEO? Is--or
should-this distinction be relevant in considering whether
spinning activity constitutes usurpation of a corporate opportunity?
One way to look at this distinction is to say that today's investors
have come to regard the payment of the CEO's greens fee as an
"accepted business practice." As such, investor expectations as to the
189. "Says Carl Thoma, a venture capitalist and former chairman of the National Venture
Capital Association: 'Once the securities industry senses it's getting in trouble, it's pretty
quick to deal with the issue.' This reality relieves the incentive for the SEC to pursue some
enforcement cases." Gasparino et al., supra note 2, at Cl; see also Siconolfi, supra note 3, at
Al ("Recently, however, Wall Street has seen a bit of a backlash. The National Venture
Capital Association, a trade group, has cautioned members that taking such IPOs could lead
to regulation of the venture-capital community.").
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behavior and business practices of their CEO are shaped based on
this shared understanding of what is an acceptable business
practice in today's world. But-in the face of an unprecedented hot
IPO market, where allocations are very hard to come by-investors
react quite differently upon learning that their CEO has used his
position to influence the underwriter in order to obtain shares of a
hot IPO for himself personally. As such, the CEO's behavior exceeds
what investors consider to be ethical standards of acceptable
business practice, and gives rise to investor disappointment, and
even anger, at how their CEO behaved in a situation not previously
encountered and, as such, not explicitly dealt with by the parties in
advance.'90
Seen from this perspective, the story of spinning provides a
compelling reason for the law to continue to enforce a fairly
rigorous standard of fiduciary duty. In framing the default rule for
corporate opportunity to include the CEO's receipt of an allocation
of shares in a hot IPO, the law continues its traditional role in
shaping the standards of what members of the business community
can reasonably expect as "fair commercial practice." The recent
developments surrounding the practice of spinning provide a
concrete illustration of the continuing importance of the role of
fiduciary law as the default rule. Rigorous judicial enforcement of
fiduciary duty standards as the default rule-a rule that cannot be
completely waived by the parties-provides the courts with the
190. This line of inquiry raises the question of whether it is reasonable and legitimate for
these investors to expect their CEO to turn over this IPO investment opportunity to his or her
corporation-or, at a minimum, to disclose the spinning activity to his corporation-rather
than seizing the opportunity to buy hot IPO shares for his own personal trading account.
What are these investors entitled to expect from their CEO? I believe that the courts, in
evaluating whether the CEO's conduct constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, will take into
account the legitimate expectations of investors (including the specific expectations of the
shareholders of a privately held company, such as GT Interactive). This conclusion is
reinforced by the recent opinion of Judge Bedsworth of the California Court of Appeals inBT-I
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (Cal. App. 1999).
Although not directly on point, since BTI involved issues of partnership opportunity, the
approach that Judge Bedsworth used reflects what is the predominant judicial attitude
towards these types of breach of fiduciary duty issues. I believe that Judge Bedsworth's
opinion reflects that modem courts do take into account the reasonableness of investors'
expectations in deciding what is the scope of a CEO's fiduciary duty to his or her corporation.
See also Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate FiduciaryPrinciplesfor the Post-Contractarian
Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 562 (1996) ("For good reasons, society is not about to relieve
corporate managers of all their fiduciary responsibilities.") (emphasis added).
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basis for intervening to protect the legitimate expectations of
investors as to what constitutes fair business practice. 9' To leave
this exclusively to contract and the reputation market, as many
corporate law scholars advocate, is to abdicate any further judicial
responsibility for monitoring the behavior of managers. Unlike these
other scholars, I believe that the courts should continue to play an
influential role in shaping standards of fair and ethical conduct for
corporate managers.
9 2
If we assume that the default rule is to treat spinning as a
corporate opportunity, then the next question is whether the CEO
can expressly contract with his corporation for the right to keep for
himself any shares that are spun out to him as part of some other
issuer's hot IPO offering. In other words, can the corporate manager
contract away the limitations imposed by the common law doctrine
of corporate opportunity? This issue is examined in the next section.
B. Contractual Limitations on the Scope of the Corporate
Opportunity Doctrine
Once we establish that the default rule of fiduciary duty law will
treat spinning as a corporate opportunity, then the next logical
question is whether this default rule may be varied by contract. It
seems that the answer to this question turns on whether the
CEO/manager can contract to limit (or even eliminate altogether)
his fiduciary duty obligations to his corporation. This is an issue of
considerable debate among legal scholars today. The story of
spinning has important implications for this debate as well.
When the practice of spinning received heightened scrutiny in the
press, it was foreseeable that corporate managers and their boards
of directors would bargain directly over who had the right to keep
any shares that were to be allocated by those broker-dealer firms
191. The debate over these issues of business ethics continues to rage. See, e.g., Jeff D.
Opdyke, Guidelines Aim to Polish Analysts' Image, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2001, at C1
(describing guidelines that are intended to address "what critics say is the lack of sufficient
independence of analysts within Wall Street firms").
192. This perspective on the continuing importance of rigorous judicial enforcement of
fiduciary duty law-and its associated role in defining investors' reasonable expectations as
to standards of fair and ethical conduct for corporate managers-is further reinforced when
one considers the role of the lawyer in rendering legal advice in the context of spinning. See
infra section IV.C.
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with which the company did business or anticipated doing business
in the future. For purposes of this Article, what is of crucial
importance is that the starting point for parties' negotiations in this
matter appears to have assumed that the modern fiduciary duty
standard imposed on corporate managers includes the corporate
opportunity doctrine. As to specific allocations of corporate oppor-
tunities that are openly and fully bargained for, I assume courts will
stand ready to enforce such agreements.
If a manager can contract to eliminate his fiduciary duty with
regard to corporate opportunities, then presumably the law should
only be concerned with establishing a clear default rule-a rule that
will serve in future cases to allocate the transaction costs of
negotiating for a different liability rule in cases involving the
spinning (allocation) of hot IPO shares. Once again, however, this
view assumes that there is an important role for the law of fiduciary
duty to play, but that once the default rule of corporate opportunity
doctrine operates to impose obligations on the company's managers,
they can vary these obligations by contract. Although the parties
may contract to allocate specific opportunities, it is doubtful to me
that all vestiges of corporate opportunity doctrine can be eliminated
by agreement between the corporation and its managers. Since I
doubt that the contract can adequately anticipate all future
situations that may give rise to a corporate opportunity, I do not
believe that the parties may contract to eliminate the corporate
opportunity doctrine altogether.
In this way, the story of spinning also emphasizes the continuing
importance of modern fiduciary duty law.'93 In the face of an
unanticipated development such as spinning, which was not
specifically addressed by the terms of the parties' bargained-for
agreement, the law of fiduciary duty takes over to define the scope
193. As a corollary, the manager may contract in advance to avoid the results imposed by
this default rule. As with any default rule, however, this approach has the added virtue of
clearly allocating the transaction costs of bargaining around the default rule. Under a
traditional analysis of corporate opportunity doctrine of the type laid out in this Article, these
costs get allocated to the manager, who knows that in the absence of disclosure and
appropriate contractual arrangements, the doctrine of corporate opportunity will continue to
be rigorously enforced by the courts. To avoid personal liability, the manager's fiduciary duty
requires that he or she assume the costs of contracting to avoid these obligations. E.g., Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 O. L. REv. 1209 (1995).
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of responsibility in the face of this unanticipated contingency.'
Investor reaction to the conduct of their managers serves as a
poignant modem day reminder that there is an important residual
role for the rule of law to play in determining the scope of fiduciary
responsibilities of corporate managers. In this way, the law of
fiduciary duty continues to shape the standards of decency and
fairness that investors can reasonably expect to govern their
corporate managers.
In an interesting twist of affairs, investment banking firms
responded to public criticism by moving on their own initiative to
adopt internal policies prohibiting the practice of spinning.'95 In
another apparent reaction to various press accounts of spinning
activity, many venture capital firms were also prompted to adopt
"best practices" as to spinning in an apparent effort to further curb
194. At a minimum, the CEO must make disclosures to the company's board of directors,
for the reasons set forth in the accompanying text. A separate question arises, however, when
considering whether disclosure of the prior spinning activity must be made to the company's
shareholders-thatis, to other investors in the companywho maynot also be serving as board
members and therefore are not privy to the disclosure made to the company's board of
directors. In considering the scope of the disclosure obligation to the company's shareholders,
the distinction between public and private companies may be most relevant. I do not believe,
however, that the distinction between publicly held and privately held companies is relevant
in determining, in the first instance, the CEO's obligation to provide disclosure to the
corporation's board of directors. The appearance of impropriety and the potential for directors
to suffer a loss of reputation with the company's investors is just as great in the case of
directors who have to answer to a cadre of venture capitalists and other individual investors
in a privately held firm as in the case of those directors who have to answer to the scrutiny
of a broader array of institutional and individual shareholders in a publicly held firm. As for
the separate issue of whether there is a need to inform the company's investors, at least one
regulator has been heard to say thatinvestors have a "right7 to know that the company's CEO
was allocated hot IPO shares by the investment bank ultimately selected to serve as the lead
underwriter for the company's IPO.
State securities regulators condemned underwriters' practice of setting aside
shares of hot new stocks for corporate executives and venture capitalists, and
said they will join their national counterparts in looking at the incentive....
"Wouldn't you as an investor in a company want to know why the chief executive
may have chosen a certain investment banker to handle the company's IPO?"
Regulators to Review Stock 'Spinning" Practice; Some Disapprove of Underwriters Setting
Aside IPO Shares for Executives, Venture Capitalists, DALLAS MORNiNG NEWs, Nov. 18,1997,
at 4D (quoting Mark J. Griffn's final speech as President of the North American Securities
Administrators Association). Needless to say, the timing and mechanism for making this kind
of disclosure will depend in large part on whether the company is privately or publicly held;
any further discussion of this issue, however, lies outside the scope of this Article.
195. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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abusive practices in this area. 9 ' All of these reform efforts within
the Wall Street community ultimately led the SEC's top
enforcement official for Wall Street, Richard Walker, Director of the
SEC's Division of Enforcement, to observe-a scant six months after
the Wall Street Journal first published its high profile account of
Mr. Cayre's spinning activity-that "the public's focus on spinning
has had the greatest impact in stamping out the practice." In
order for this self-correcting process to occur, however, the con-
clusion I draw from all these reform efforts voluntarily undertaken
by various market participants is that the law of fiduciary duty
must be rigorously enforced. In this way it allocates responsibility
in such a way as to encourage disclosure of these potentially abusive
practices, such as spinning, which by their very nature present
significant potential for conflict of interests. By enforcing a default
rule that encourages the corporate manager to disclose spinning
activity, the rule of law promotes transparency in corporate decision
making, thereby making it easier for investors and others to hold
corporate managers accountable for their boardroom decisions and
other actions taken on the company's behalf. In this way, the courts
continue their tradition of enforcing fiduciary duty standards to
monitor business ethics of corporate managers.
In sum, the story of spinning provides a real and concrete
testimonial in support of the proposition that managers cannot
contract away all vestiges of their fiduciary duty.98 In the face of
academic proposals that modern corporate law reflects a nexus of
contracts that provides parties with complete freedom to negotiate
terms of their bargain," including the freedom to define completely
the scope of fiduciary duties of corporate managers, other scholars
have suggested that the courts should-and will-refuse to adopt
this approach.2" Our recent experience with spinning offers support
for the view that the rule of law is not dead and that the courts
should be encouraged to rely on the doctrine of fiduciary duty in
196. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (describing reaction and reform efforts
voluntarily undertaken within the venture capital industry).
197. Siconolfi, SEC Broadens, supra note 26, at C1.
198. Campbell, supra note 190, at 561.
199. E.g., HenryN. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: AResponse
to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
200. E.g., Campbell, supra note 190, at 561; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989).
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order to monitor the standards of fair and ethical conduct on the
part of modem corporate managers.
C. The Implications of the Story of Spinning for the Role of the
Lawyer as Counselor-at-Law
Judicial adherence to the traditional rule-that the law of
fiduciary duty continues to serve an influential residual role in
defining the scope of managers' responsibilities-has important
implications for the role of lawyers in counseling their clients in a
transactional setting. Rigorous judicial enforcement of fiduciary
duty law offers the added virtue of strengthening the professional
responsibilities of lawyers who must advise clients as to the
application of fiduciary duty principles in the context of new and
unanticipated developments in the markets, such as that presented
by the recent controversy surrounding the practice of spinning. If
the lawyer knows that the courts stand ready to rigorously enforce
modern fiduciary duty standards, then the lawyer knows that she
stands on firm ground in advising clients how to deal with
circumstances not anticipated by the specific terms of the parties'
agreement. To do anything else is to further erode the role of the
lawyer as a professional legal advisor by fostering an environment
where business people are encouraged to shop for legal advice to
their liking, a socially undesirable and unproductive outcome.
This perspective on the role of the lawyer as counselor-at-law is
usefully illustrated in the story of spinning. Let us now examine the
story of spinning from the perspective of the lawyer who is
approached for legal advice as to the scope of fiduciary respon-
sibilities that arise in the context of spinning activity of the kind
originally described in the Wall Street Journal article regarding
Mr. Cayre of GT Interactive. Assuming the lawyers were to analyze
this problem under well-established or traditional principles of
fiduciary law, the corporate lawyer in this situation would be well-
advised to counsel his client that the default rule of fiduciary duty
law requires that, at a minimum, the manager, Mr. Cayre, come
forward and make disclosure of the spinning opportunity before
accepting the shares. By analyzing the practice of spinning under
modern principles of corporate opportunity doctrine, the lawyer
advising Mr. Cayre could confidently conclude that this type of
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disclosure should serve to protect this CEO/manager from future
claims of breach of fiduciary duty by removing the corporate
opportunity taint from his acceptance of the allocation of Pixar's hot
IPO shares.
In considering the application of fiduciary duty principles to the
practice of spinning, one important aspect of this analysis is often
overlooked. By continuing to adhere to this demanding standard of
fiduciary duty as the default rule, lawyers will be encouraged to
analyze the conduct at issue (in this case, the practice of spinning),
and reach a reasoned conclusion as to the prospect for a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty in the future. In this way, lawyers are not
allowed to abdicate their professional responsibilities as counselors-
at-law. To do otherwise, I fear, is to erode the meaningful profes-
sional role that the lawyer traditionally has provided in counseling
clients in the transactional setting.2 ' I believe that rigorous judicial
enforcement of fiduciary duty has the important, but usually
overlooked, incidental advantage of strengthening the professional
role of lawyers by giving them firm ground on which to exercise
their professional judgment in advising their clients on thorny
issues involving potential conflicts of interest.
As this Article has demonstrated, the story of spinning offers a
number of different reasons why the courts should continue to
vigorously enforce the rule of law. By continuing to adhere to strict
fiduciary duty standards as the default rule, I believe that this
judicial approach has the added value of holding lawyers to an
exacting standard in counseling their clients in situations where
questionable or unethical business practices arise. 2
CONCLUSION
This analysis of the recent (and ongoing) controversy over the
practice of "spinning" serves as a compelling real-world reminder
201. The trend I perceive under a contract-based approach-that allows parties to contract
away all vestiges of fiduciary duty other than what is set forth under the terms of the parties'
bargain-would allow the lawyer to avoid making difficult judgment calls as to potential
conflicts of interest that may give rise to possible breach of fiduciary duty claims in the future.
202. E.g., Kostant, supra note 67, at 1267 (2000) (advocating a gatekeeper function for
corporate lawyers practicing in the transactional setting that would likewise have the virtue
of promoting "norms of corporate legal practice [that] will better conform with the evolving
norms of corporate governance").
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that the law of fiduciary duty cannot be completely eliminated by
appropriate contractual provisions. The manner in which securities
regulators, market forces, and Wall Street participants themselves
have dealt with potential conflict of interest problems inherent
in the practice of spinning more than amply demonstrate the
important residual role that the law of fiduciary duty continues to
play in defining the scope of a corporate manager's responsibilities
to his or her corporation.
Although spinning may not be as prevalent a practice as it was
when the IPO market was sizzling a few years ago, there are
nonetheless important lessons to be learned from our recent
experience dealing with the pernicious practice of spinning. The
framework that is used to analyze the validity of recent spinning
practices-as presenting a situation involving unanticipated
market developments-is instructive for analyzing future cases of
unanticipated circumstances and conduct, in the context of IPOs as
well as in other types of transactions. The analytical framework and
legal response to spinning are instructive because they suggest how
investors expect the courts to go about interpreting the scope of
modern fiduciary duty law as applied to the next unanticipated
situation to present a potential conflict of interest problem for the
corporate manager-a situation that will inevitably arise as the
securities markets grow and as commercial practices evolve to
accommodate these changing market conditions.
In responding to the recent controversy over the practice of
spinning, I am not recommending promulgation of yet another rule,
although some securities lawyers have suggested that the SEC
should mandate disclosure of the practice of spinning. Instead, I am
of the view that lawyers have an important role to play in giving
advice to their clients about the potential for conflict-of-interest
problems in cases such as spinning. I therefore recommend that we
rigorously enforce an exacting standard of fiduciary duty, which will
have the virtue of compelling corporate managers to come forward
with full disclosure, and also encourage lawyers to advise their
clients to do so and thereby avoid potential liability for breach of
their fiduciary duty to the corporation and its investors.
This Article offers support for continuing the common law
tradition of vigorous judicial enforcement of fiduciary duty
standards as applied to the conduct of modern corporate managers
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(and, of necessity, to their lawyers). Indeed, the very reason to tell
the story of spinning is that it serves as a powerful reminder of how
fiduciary duty law continues to be important in fulfilling investors'
legitimate expectations as to what is fair and ethical conduct for
corporate managers in today's complicated business world. This is
a story well worth telling.
